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Abstract 
In this paper, we test the information content of dividends (ICD) hypothesis for 
Norwegian non-listed firms, to explore whether dividend changes have positive 
relationship with future earnings. After applying both linear and nonlinear models, 
we find it difficult to support the ICD hypothesis for Norwegian non-listed firms, 
including large and small firms. Since there is a tax reform during 2004 to 2006 in 
Norway, we test the ICD hypothesis separately in two different tax systems as 
well as in certain years with transitionary rules. The results demonstrate that 
dividend decreases negative relate with further earnings in new tax system and 
ICD valid for small firms in 2001 and for the entire sample in 2005. 
 
 
 
Key words: Dividend changes, ICD hypothesis, tax reform, ROE, future earnings
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1. Introduction 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) develop the information content of dividends (ICD) 
hypothesis, dividend increases convey positive information about future earning 
and profitability while dividend decreases convey negative information. Many 
researchers have done empirical tests on this hypothesis and some results show 
support for it, while some find little or no evidence to support it. 
 
As one of the most important issues in corporate finance, the ICD hypothesis is 
discussed frequently, but most of the reports focus on the US market rather than 
other countries.  Considering that the market environments what companies face, 
such as regulatory regimes, economic and tax policies, are quite different in 
Norway from those in the United States, we believe that it is worthwhile to test 
the hypothesis in Norwegian market. An additional motivation for this study was 
given by the 2004-2006 Norwegian tax reform. This constitutes a significant 
opportunity to explore the ICD hypothesis in the same market, but under different 
dividend taxation systems. Furthermore, we focus on a sample of mainly private 
firms, which represents a significant departure from the approach used in most 
previous papers on the subject. 
 
In this paper, we focus on testing the ICD hypothesis for Norwegian non-listed 
firms from 1994 to 2009, aiming to find whether there is a significant positive 
relationship between dividend changes and further earnings. Taking into account 
the effects of firm size on dividends policy, we also test the ICD hypothesis on 
different firm sizes: the large Norwegian firms and small Norwegian firms. 
Additionally, as we mentioned before, the Norwegian government issued new tax 
policies from 2004 to 2006 with the effect of increasing the marginal tax rate on 
dividend income. This reform influenced the policies of dividend payment 
Dividend Changes and Firm Performance                                               01.09.2011                                                                                                                                      
 2 
significantly, hence we test the ICD hypothesis in different periods based on the 
different tax systems: 1998-2003 and 2006-2009 respectively, and also investigate 
the hypothesis in 2001, 2004 and 2005 in which certain transitionary rules were 
implemented. 
 
We begin by using model equations similar to those employed by Nissim and Ziv 
(2001), the basic model analysis and the asymmetric analysis for dividend 
increases and dividend decreases.  The models employed by Nissim and Ziv (2001) 
assume that the process and the autocorrelation of earnings is linear, but some 
scholars argue that the mean reversion process and the autocorrelation of earning 
are nonlinear. Therefore, we also employ the nonlinear model equation suggested 
by Grullon et al. (2005) in order to control for the problem of nonlinearity of 
earnings. In all the models, all the regression coefficients are estimated by using 
the Fama and Macbeth (1973) procedure. 
 
We cannot find evidence to support the ICD hypothesis for non-listed Norwegian 
firms in the whole period, nor for large or small Norwegian firms under both the 
linear and nonlinear models. The results also indicate that the ICD hypothesis is 
not valid in both two different periods, but valid in 2001 for small firms and in 
2005 for non-listed market. 
 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the relevant theories 
regarding the ICD hypothesis, and some articles about dividend changes as a 
signal of firm performance.  Section 3 reports our sample selection and data 
description. In Section 4, we test the ICD hypothesis for Norwegian non-listed 
firm using both a linear model and nonlinear model of earnings expectations and 
then analyze the regression results. Section 5 presents the conclusions of our study. 
In the Appendix, we show the many variable measurement procedures in our tests. 
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2. Literature Review 
Many researchers and market practitioners believe that dividend policies convey 
informational content regarding firm‟s expected profitability, they provide many 
important theoretical (e.g. Miller and Rock, 1985)) and empirical results 
supporting the hypotheses (e.g. Nissim and Ziv, 2001). However, some scholars 
report different findings through actual tests of the relationship between dividend 
changes and future earnings changes, e.g. Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997). 
 
2.1 Theoretical Framwork 
2.1.1 Dividend payment modeling 
Dividend payment modeling work begins with Lintner‟s (1956) ground-breaking 
study, he documents that “major changes in earnings or levels of earnings "out of 
line" with existing dividend rates were the most important determinants of the 
company's dividend decisions”(Lintner,1956,101), which means the main 
determinants of changes in dividend are current earnings and preceding dividend 
level. Additionally, in Lintner (1956)‟s study, “the managements generally 
believed that, their fiduciary responsibilities and standards of fairness required 
them to distribute part of any substantial increase in earnings to the stockholders 
in dividends unless there were other compelling reasons to the contrary” (Lintner, 
1956, 100), it implies firms increase their dividends only when managements are 
confident that increased earnings would be sustained. 
 
2.1.2 The information content of dividends (ICD) hypotheses  
On the basis of Lintner‟s study, Miller and Modigliani (1961) develop a theory 
called „the information content of dividends (ICD) hypotheses‟, which is also the 
core problem we desire to investigate and check. “A change in the dividend rate is 
often followed by a change in the market price (sometimes spectacularly so), such 
a phenomenon would not be incompatible with irrelevance to the extent that it 
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was merely a reflection of what might be called the "informational content" of 
dividends”(Miller and Modigliani,1961,430). 
The definition of ICD implies a firm has adopted a policy of dividend stabilization 
with a long established and generally appreciated "target payout ratio," investors 
have good reason to interpret a change in dividend policy as a change in 
management's points of future profit prospects for the firm.  
 
We prefer the definition by Watts (1973): information content of dividends refers 
to “the hypothesis which states that dividends convey information about future 
earnings-information that enables market participants to predict future earnings 
more accurately” (Watts, 1973, 191). 
 
2.1.3 Dividend signaling theory 
Compared with previous papers, Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), 
and Miller and Rock (1985) provide formal models to show that dividends can be 
used as a signal of firm quality. Bhattacharya (1979)‟s article develops the 
signaling cost structure model in which cash dividends function as a signal of 
future cash flows of firms under an imperfect-information condition. Bhattacharya 
believes that the model is not only realistic (dividends linked only to expected 
cash flows), but also the only simple structure consistent with the assumption of 
an exogenously costly dividend-signaling equilibrium. John and Williams (1985) 
develop a signaling equilibrium with taxable dividends. According to its 
properties, insiders in firms with truly more valuable future cash inflows distribute 
larger dividends and receive higher stock prices and dividends reveal information 
more than that conveyed by public audits of corporate cash inflows. Miller and 
Rock (1985) show an informational consistent signaling equilibrium exists under 
asymmetric information and the trading of shares that restores the time 
consistency of investment policy, but leads in general to lower levels of 
investment than the optimum achievable under full information and/or no trading.  
 
Dividend Changes and Firm Performance                                               01.09.2011                                                                                                                                      
 5 
In a word, the above articles suggest us that dividend changes convey valuable 
information about future cash flows and future earnings. Specifically, dividend 
increases convey good news; oppositely, dividend decreases convey bad news. 
The models also predict a positive relationship between dividend changes and the 
price reaction to dividend changes.  
 
2.2 Empirical studies and Results 
2.2.1 Support Studies 
Pettit (1972), Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Dielman 
and Oppenheimer (1984) prove that dividend change is positively associated with 
abnormal returns in the stock price of the underlying firm by assessing the 
announcements of dividend change and related responses in the stock market. It 
indicates that dividend increases can be seen as a positive signal of the firm‟s 
future earnings and then also of the firm‟s shares value. One of the key 
implications of these models is that dividend changes should positively relate with 
changes in firm profitability (earnings growth rates or return on assets). 
 
Kale and Noe (1990) present a two-period model in which dividends act as a 
signal of the stability of the firm's future cash flows. It documents that firms with 
more stable future cash flows pay a higher dividend and dividends are seen to be 
an increasing function of expected cash flow. Brooks, Charlton and Hendershott 
(1998) report that firms have a high frequency of relatively large dividend 
increases prior to the cash flow shock. The dividend changes can be interpreted as 
signals about future profitability by investors. However, they also suggest that 
signaling only plays a relatively minor role in corporate dividend policy. 
According to Koch and Shenoy (1999), their research results indicate that 
dividend policies interact to provide significant predictive information regarding 
expected cash flow.  
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Goergen et al. (2005) reports that net earnings are key determinants of dividend 
changes consistent with Lintner (1956)‟s point. However, they find the occurrence 
of a loss is a key determinant of dividends in addition to the traditional key 
determinant, the level of net earnings. Additionally, the majority of dividend cuts 
or omissions are temporary. 
 
2.2.2 Different findings 
However, there are some studies not supporting ICD hypothesized relation 
between dividend changes and future earnings, studies by Watts (1973), Gonedes 
(1978), Penman (1983), Healy and Palepu (1988), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner (1996), Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (BMT, 1997), and Grullon, 
Michaely and Swaminathan (2002). They find little or no evidence that dividend 
changes can predict future earnings.  
 
For example, Watts (1973) finds that on average the relationship between future 
earnings changes and current unexpected dividend changes is positive, but this is 
not statistically significant; furthermore, any inside information management may 
use in determining dividends is lost in the noise in the dividend model. Thus, he 
concludes that the ICD is not economically meaningful. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner (1996) suggest that managers tend to increase dividends because of 
overoptimistic forecasts about future earnings, and therefore the ICD is unreliable. 
Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) find no evidence of positive abnormal 
earnings changes after dividend increases. Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan 
(2002) point that firms which increase dividends experience significant decline in 
their systematic risk, profitability, capital expenditures and cash levels, and 
suggest that dividend increases may be an important element of a firm‟s long-term 
transition from growth to a more mature phase.  
 
2.2.3 Nissim and Ziv 
Although many papers do not support „the ICD hypothesis‟, the study of Nissim 
and Ziv (2001), who uses an alternative methodology, provides strong evidence 
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supporting this hypothesis. They argue that researchers have been using the wrong 
models to control for the expected changes in earnings and the wrong models 
result in failing to discover the true relation between dividends and future earnings. 
Nissim and Ziv investigate the relation between dividend changes and future 
profitability, measured in terms of either future earnings or future abnormal 
earnings. They document several important findings as following: 
a) Dividend changes are positively related to earnings changes in each of the two 
years following the dividend change after controlling for the expected change 
in future earnings.  
b) Dividend changes provide information about the level of profitability in 
subsequent years, incremental to market and accounting data.   
However, the findings are not symmetric for dividend increases and decreases. 
Dividend increases are associated with future profitability for at least four years 
after the dividend change, whereas dividend decreases are not related to future 
profitability after controlling for current and expected profitability. Nissim and 
Ziv point that the lack of association between dividend decreases and future 
profitability is caused by accounting conservatism. 
 
However, some scholars consider the results shown by Nissim and Ziv (2001) are 
likely to be biased. Although NZ add the ROE and lagged variable of earnings 
into the model to tackle the problem of autocorrelation, NZ still do not take 
account of the nonlinear mean reversion process of earning. Elgers and Lo (1994) 
and Fama and French (2000) point out the mean reversion process and the level of 
autocorrelation in the earning process are not linear. Therefore, Grullon et al. 
(2005) issues a nonlinear model to control the nonlinearity of earning process and 
the empirical results of Grullon et al. (2005) objects to Nissim and Ziv‟s (2001) 
findings.  
 
Dividend Changes and Firm Performance                                               01.09.2011                                                                                                                                      
 8 
2.2.4 Firm size and dividend policy 
In this paper, we also examine the relationship between the ICD hypothesis and 
firm size. Many scholars have found that there is a relation between firm size and 
dividends policy. Fama and French (2001) indicate that the decline of the percent 
of firms paying cash dividends during 1978-1999 is due in part to the changing 
characteristics of publicly traded firms. They document that larger firms and more 
profitable firms are more likely to pay dividends. It indicates that there is a 
significant relation between firm size and dividend policy. On the basis of this 
article, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) also consistently reveal statistically 
significant relations between the probability of a firm pays dividends and its size, 
showing that the probability that a firm pays dividends is significantly and 
positively related to profitability and size, and negatively related to growth. 
 
2.2.5 2004- 2006 Norwegian shareholder income tax reform 
Norwegian 2006 shareholder income tax reform, which introduces a partial double 
taxation of dividends paid to individual Norwegian shareholders. It increases top 
marginal tax rates on individual dividend income from 0 to 28%. The shareholder 
income tax applies to all income from shares, both dividends and capital gains. 
This means that the effective marginal tax rate on income from shares is 48.2 %, 
close to the top marginal tax rate on labor income of 47.8 %. 
 
The first warning of shareholder income tax increase in prospect came in 2000, 
when the parliament approved a temporary tax on capital gains and dividends for 
the income year 2001. In 2001, the interim tax was abolished, but no new tax 
system was introduced. The Skauge Committee presented its recommendations 
early 2003, the government proposal came early 2004, and transitory rules were 
passed on March 26, 2004. The parliament agreed to the reform the same year, to 
be implemented from January 1, 2006. (Alstadsæter and Fjærli, 2009, 9) 
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Alstadsæter and Fjærli (2009) document strong timing effects on dividend payout 
on a large panel of non-listed firms, with a surge of dividends prior to 2006 and a 
sharp drop after. They show that the model set-up with stylized life-cycle behavior 
of firms appears to be fairly realistic, with high asset growth increasing the 
probability of zero dividends and with mature firms being more likely to pay 
dividends. The most important finding is that the timing of dividend payments 
appear to be sensitive to changes in the taxation of shareholders, this conclusion 
indicates that 2006 Norwegian shareholder income tax reform may reflect the 
relation between the dividend changes and future profitability surrounding the tax 
reform year, for example, tax exemption for dividends paid to corporations as 
owners from March 26, 2004, and no tax on dividends until January 1st 2006, 
distribute earnings as tax exempt dividends during the accounting year of 2004. It 
may be an explanation of the extreme increase in corporate profits from 2003 to 
2004. 
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3. Data 
3.1 Sample Selection 
We collected all the data for our analysis from the Centre for Corporate 
Governance Research (CCGR) database, paying special attention to the private 
industry in general, including non-listed firms and family firms in particular. The 
data provided by the CCGR is relatively complete and high-quality. By including 
accounting and ownership data for non-listed Norwegian firms the initial sample 
contained 2 542 956 firm-years ranges from 1994 until 2009, that represented 14 
un-consolidated variables. However, since this initial un-consolidated data could 
cause noise in our study we applied certain filters in order to remove firms that 
could skew the analysis.  
 
First, since our study only focuses on Norwegian private limited liability 
companies (AS) and Norwegian public limited liability companies (ASA), we 
removed all the other types of firms, so that only AS and ASA firms remained. 
The firms which are not independent were also deleted, because cash transfers 
could be distorted for those firms. 
 
Secondly, we found some abnormal data in the sample, such as negative tangible 
assets, zero revenues. This indicated the possibility that the sample contained 
some erroneous observations and certain shell firms, which are not the object of 
our study. In order to reduce the noise and get valid empirical results, we 
employed a number of criteria in order to exclude the abnormal observations from 
the sample: 
i. Dividends < 0; 
ii. Total tangible assets≤0; 
iii. Total assets≤0; 
iv. Revenues≤0. 
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Furthermore, since the objective and the methodology of our paper is based on 
NZ‟s paper, we followed similar criteria of data selecting as those employed by 
NZ in order to complete the final sample selection. Firms were only included in 
the final sample if they paid an ordinary yearly cash dividend in the current year 
and in the previous year. Since firms in Norway only pay dividends once a year 
rather than every quarter as in the US, we needn‟t employ the remaining three 
criteria used by NZ. In the end, there were 69 164 firm-years in our final sample 
ranging over the period 1998 to 2009. 
 
3.2 Data Description 
In this part, we make a simple description of our sample data. As Table 1 shows, 
the dividend events are divided into three types: increase, decrease and no change 
in dividends. The total numbers of firms that experience for increases, decreases 
and no changes in dividends during 1999-2009 are 28023, 20393, and 5748 
respectively. We observe that increases in dividends are more frequent than 
decreases in dividends, similar to Nissim and Ziv‟s (2001) finding. 
 
Table 1 
Frequency of firm-year observations with at least one dividend event by fiscal year 
Year Increase Decrease No change Total 
1999 3349 1556 862 5767 
2000 2708 3597 1101 7406 
2001 4741 2049 1054 7844 
2002 5263 2983 879 9125 
2003 4438 4813 791 10042 
2004 5277 3497 323 9097 
2005 423 752 102 1277 
2006 566 293 158 1017 
2007 477 213 120 810 
2008 462 329 183 974 
2009 319 311 175 805 
Total 28023 20393 5748 54164 
This table reports the numbers of firms that increase, decrease or do not change dividends 
compared with the previous year. 
Dividend Changes and Firm Performance                                               01.09.2011                                                                                                                                      
 12 
From Table 1, we observe that the numbers of firms with dividend increases, 
decreases and no changes fell dramatically in 2005. This is attributable to the tax 
reform in Norway which was implemented from January 1, 2006. The reform 
increased the top marginal tax rates on individual dividend income from 0 to 28%. 
In 2005, the number of firms with dividend increases dropped by 92% compared 
to the number in 2004. Nearly 59% firms chose to reduce their dividends in 2005; 
however, most firms (58%) increased their dividends in 2004. Additionally, there 
are a large number of firms omitting dividends. The 2004-2006 tax reform has had 
a significant impact on firm dividend policy during those years. In order to 
observe the impact of the tax reform on the ICD hypothesis, we separate the 
sample into two periods: 1998-2003 and 2006-2009. 
 
As shown in Figure 1, there was a substantial increase in annual average dividend 
from 1998 to 2005.  According to Alstadsæter and Fjærli (2009), savings spurred 
by lower marginal tax rates on capital income can be a reason to explain some of 
dividends increase in this period. A lot of this dividend growth can also be 
attributed to the change of economic incentives for the firms through the 
introduction of the dual income tax in 1992, as discussed by Alstadsæter, Fjærli 
and Thoresen (2009).  There is a sharp increase in average dividends in 2005 (see 
Figure 1), which can seen as clear timing effects in response to the increased 
dividend taxes of 2006. Since some large firms still paid dividends to respond to 
the higher tax rate, while the majority of small firms stopped paying dividends in 
2005, thus the average dividend increased dramatically when the tax rate is higher 
because of the decreased number of small firms that year.  
  
There was a substantial decrease in average dividend from 2006-2009 (see Figure 
1), with dividends dropping sharply both in 2006 and 2007. The decrease in 
dividends after the implementation of the tax reform can be explained by several 
factors: one is the pure timing effect and is only a transitory effect, as the firms 
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accelerate their dividend payments prior to the reform. And another reason is that 
closely held firms find substitutes for dividend payments such as hiding 
consumption expenditures into the operating expenses, or that they believe that 
tax rates will drop again in the future. In the meanwhile, the corporation is used 
more or less as a savings box. This is a more permanent effect. (Alstadsæter and 
Fjærli, 2009, 25) Additionally, from our point of view, the financial crisis in 
2007-2009 also can be a reason for the decrease in dividends. 
 
Figure 1 
Annual average dividends per firm during 1998-2009 
 
 
We have also constructed a table of summary statistics (Table 2) for each of the 
three dividend variation groups (increasing, decreasing and no change) and for the 
whole sample. The statistics illustrate the average percentage change in dividends 
( DIVR ), the Return on earnings (ROE) and the average size of firms in each 
dividend change percentile group.  
 
In Table 2, DIVR refers to the percentage change in dividends and is defined as 
below: 
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

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DIVDIV
DIVR                                                             (1) 
In Equation (1), 0DIVR  means the dividend at year 0 and 1DIVR means the 
dividend in the year before.  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for dividend event observations 
  Mean Median STD 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Panel A. Dividend Increases 
R△DIV(%) 251.60  81.82  1325.94  14.29  33.33  81.98  200.00  468.42  
ROE (%) 91.30  58.79  115.80  -0.74  18.30  58.80  133.11  239.90  
Total Equity 3195862  436000  52944332  123000  205000  437000  1066000  2724000  
Panel B. Dividend Decrease 
R△DIV(%) -42.64  -40.00  25.26  -79.55  -61.36  -40.00  -21.15  -10.00  
ROE (%) 57.69  32.68  94.67  -17.39  4.86  32.68  89.54  173.13  
Total Equity 2409947  387000  34947288  113000  181000  388000  961000  2490000  
Panel C. No Change 
ROE (%) 23.90  14.00  48.82  -11.30  2.34  14.00  37.12  69.18  
Total Equity 3473438  939000  27701029  208000  425000  940000  2308000  5886000  
Panel D. Whole Sample 
R△DIV(%) 114.12  5.56  964.49  -59.97  -27.88  5.59  88.02  260.00  
ROE (%) 71.53  41.28  105.29  -8.67  9.04  41.30  105.49  202.92  
Total Equity 2929418  453000  44627688  122000  206000  454000  1131000  3019000  
This table reports sample firm characteristics about RΔDIV, ROE and total equity. RΔDIV is 
the annual percentage change in the cash dividend payment. ROE means return on earnings, is 
equal to the earnings before extraordinary items scaled by the book value of equity. Total 
equity is the market value of equity. The values of all financial variables are determined at the 
beginning of the year of the dividend announcement. 
 
Panel A reports that the average change in dividend for the „dividend increases‟ 
group is 251.60%, which is considerably larger than the 16.42% reported in the 
US study (Nissim and Ziv, 2001). One reason why the average increase in 
dividend in Norway is significantly larger than that in the US is because the firms 
in the Nissim and Ziv article are large firms that usually have stable dividend 
payments. Our sample includes many small firms that usually have more volatile 
dividend payout. Another reason is the tax reform discussed above; dividends 
increased quickly from 1998 to 2005, and peaked in 2005. In panel B, 
representing the „dividend decrease‟ group, the average change in dividend is 
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42.64%, and this is very close to the average drop of 42.67% reported by Nissim 
and Ziv.  
 
We have also made a comparative analysis for the five subgroups formed on the 
basis of different percentages of dividend change. As shown in panel A (the 
„dividend-increase‟ group) the larger the dividend increase, the higher were the 
values of firms‟ ROE. However, in the „dividend-decrease‟ group (Panel C), the 
larger the dividend decrease, the lower were the firm ROE values. This seems to 
indicate that firms increase dividends with ROE increases and decrease dividends 
with ROE decreases, i.e. dividend changes are positively related to changes in 
firm profitability (earnings growth rates or ROE), which are very consistent with 
the ICD hypothesis we discuss. It also shows that the more profitable firms are 
more likely to pay dividends (Fama and French, 2001). 
 
Another firm characteristic---total equity, the market value of the equity, is far 
larger in the „dividend-increase‟ group than that of the „dividend-decrease‟ group. 
This case is similar to the one which reported in the United States. Similar to 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006), we observed that the probability of a firm 
paying dividends is significantly and positively related to profitability and firm 
size. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Linear Model of Earnings Expectations 
In this section, we initially investigate the ICD hypothesis using two linear models 
of earnings expectations as a baseline. 
 
4.1.1Cross-sectional Analysis 
At the beginning, we conduct basic cross-sectional regression analysis employed 
by Nissim and Ziv (2001) to assess the ICD hypothesis. As the Equation (2) show, 
Et is the earnings before extraordinary items in year t, B-1 denotes the book value 
of equity at the end of the previous year, ROEt-1 is the return on Bt-1, and RΔDIV0 
is the change rate of dividend in current year calculated by Equation (1).  
tttt ROEDIVRBEE    1201011 /)(                                         （2） 
We test the ICD hypothesis using data collected from 1998 to 2009, the 
independent variable of the regression is derived from RΔDIV0 from 1999 to 2008 
for t = 1 and from 1999 to 2007 for t = 2. 
 
Here, we use Equation (2) to assess the ICD hypothesis for small firms, large 
firms and the whole sample during 1998-2009. Table 3 reports some statistics 
from Equation (2).  
 
In the panel A of the „small firms‟ group and the panel C (whole sample), the 
coefficients of dividend changes are positive and negative for t=1 and t=2 
respectively, but all of them are insignificant, which means there is no significant 
relation between dividend changes and further earnings changes for small 
Norwegian non-listed firms. In the panel B of the „large firms‟ group, the 
coefficients of dividend changes are negative for t=1 and t=2 and statistically 
significant for t=1. This demonstrates that as the dividend increases (decreases), 
the future earnings tend to decrease (increase) for the next year.  
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Table 3  
Summary Statistics from cross-sectional regressions of the future earnings change, 
deflated by the book value, on the dividend change and control variables 
tttt ROEDIVRBEE    1201011 /)(  
Panel A: Small firms 
t α0 α1 α2 R
2 N 
1  -0.0099  0.0959  -0.0018  
0.4249  603  
t-value -0.2055  0.9215  -1.1651  
2  0.1753  -0.2521  0.0010  
0.0010  394  
t-value    3.1225* -1.5144  0.7575  
Panel B: Large firms 
1  0.3213  -0.0156  -0.0015  
0.0267  32576  
t-value     2.0153**   -4.1034* -1.6051  
2  0.0918  -0.0014  -0.0013  
0.0292  19642  
t-value 0.4697  -0.1271  -0.8919  
Panel C: Whole sample 
1  0.3134  0.0035  -0.0015  
0.0304  33179  
t-value     2.0075** 0.2042  -1.6210  
2  0.0872  -0.0057  -0.0012  
0.0277  20036  
t-value 0.4561  -0.5403  -0.8302  
This table reports estimates of regressions relating raw earnings changes to dividend changes. 
Et denotes the earnings before extraordinary items in year t (year 0 is the event year). B-1 
denotes the book value of equity at the end of year -1. RΔDIV0 denotes the annual percentage 
change in the cash dividend payment in year 0. ROEt-1 equals the earnings before 
extraordinary items in year t = 1 scaled by the book value of equity at the end of year t = 1. R
2
 
is the average (adjusted) R
2
 of the cross-sectional regressions. *, ** and *** denote 
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
In short, our results do not support the ICD hypothesis but indicates a negative 
relationship between dividend changes and further earning in subsequent year for 
large Norwegian non-listed firms. The conclusion are very different from that 
reported by Nissim and Ziv (2001), α1 is positive and significant in the US market.  
 
However, Benartzi (1997) reports that changes in dividend and changes in 
contemporaneous earnings are highly correlated, which means that the negative 
relationship between dividend changes and earnings changes in large firm may 
because of the autocorrelation of earning. And the solution is to add the lagged 
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variable of the dependent variable, using   110  BEE  as an independent 
variable. We will do that in the next model. 
 
4.1.2Cross-sectional Analysis for asymmetric dividend changes 
Some scholars document that the ICD hypothesis may be asymmetrical for 
dividend increase and dividend decrease, so it is better to do separate analysis for 
dividend increase and dividend decrease. Considering the problem of 
autocorrelation mentioned in previous model, we employ the following equation 
used by Nissim and Ziv (2001), to split the effects of dividend increase group and 
dividend decrease group. 
0201011 /)( DIVRDPCDIVRDPCBEE tt     
                   
  ttt ROEBEE    14113
        
         (3)
 
In the equation (3), both DPC and DNC are dummy variables. When dividend 
change is positive, DPC is equal to 1 and DNC is 0; when dividend change is 
negative, DPC takes the value of 0 and DNC is 1. Thus, 1 represents the 
coefficient of the dividend increase group and 2  presents the coefficient of the 
dividend decrease group. 
 
Table 4 reports the regression results and it indicates that there is no evidence to 
support the ICD hypothesis. All the three panels show that the coefficients of 
dividend changes, including the dividend increases and dividend decreases, are 
not statistically significant for t=1 and t=2. 
 
Combining the results of two linear models, we can conclude that the ICD 
hypothesis is not valid for non-listed firms in Norway. Additional, considering the 
possible problem of autocorrelation caused by the first model, we cannot say a 
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negative relationship between dividend changes and further earnings for large 
Norwegian non-listed firms. 
 
Table 4 
Summary statistics from cross-sectional regression of the future earnings change, 
deflated by the book value, on the dividend change and control variables 
tt
tt
ROE
BEEDIVRDNCDIVRDPCBEE






14
11030201011 /)()()(/)(
 
Panel A: Small firms 
t α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 R
2 N 
1 -0.0927  0.3598  0.2518  -0.2213  -0.0018  
0.4538  603 
t-value -1.2348  1.2944  0.3883  -0.5641  -1.1925  
2 0.0687  0.0585  -1.2265  0.5028  0.0003  
0.1962  394 
t-value 0.8251  0.4391  -1.4769  1.2753  0.2529  
Panel B: Large firms 
1 0.2694  0.0104  -0.0945  -0.3559  -0.0004  
0.1359  32575 
t-value 1.6614***  1.2662  -0.7010  -3.7533*  -0.5760  
2 0.1014  -0.0041  -0.0031  0.0489  -0.0012  
0.0423  19642 
t-value 0.4571  -0.4033  -0.0129  0.7296  -0.9195  
Panel C: Whole sample 
1 0.2478  0.0270  -0.1110  -0.3554  -0.0004  
0.1398  33178 
t-value 1.5409  1.0936  -0.8441  -3.7399*  -0.5176  
2 0.0846  -0.0018  -0.0270  0.0484  -0.0011  
0.0412  20036 
t-value 0.3951  -0.1781  -0.1158  0.7177  -0.8600  
This table reports estimates of regressions relating raw earnings changes to dividend changes. 
DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) 
and 0 otherwise. R
2
 is the average (adjusted) R
2
 of the cross-sectional regressions. *, ** and 
*** denote significant difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
4.2 Nonlinear Model of Earnings Expectations 
The previous models used assume that the earnings‟ process of and 
autocorrelation are linear, however, many scholars, such as Fama and French 
(2000), argue that the process and autocorrelation of earnings are nonlinear. So we 
employ the nonlinear model suggested by Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan 
(2002), as shown in equation (4), to test the valid of ICD hypothesis. 
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 
 t
tt
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(
/)(
(4)
 
 
In this equation, DEF0 equals to ROE0-E [ROE0] and E [ROE0] is the fitted value 
from the regression of ROE on the logarithm of total assets in previous year, the 
logarithm of sales-to-assets ratio in previous year and ROE in previous year. 
NDFED0 (PDFED0) takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is negative (positive) and 0 
otherwise. CE0 refers to (E0-E-1)/B-1 and NCED0 (PCED) take the value of 1 if 
CE0 is negative (positive) and 0 otherwise. DPC is the dummy variable for 
dividend increases, and DNC is for dividend decrease. 
 
Table 5 
Summary statistics from nonlinear regression of the future earnings change, 
deflated by the book value, on the dividend change 
 
 t
tt
CECEPCEDCENCEDNCED
DFEDFEPDFEDDFENDFEDNDFED
DIVRDNCDIVRDPCBEE




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 
）004003021
0004003021
02001011
(
/)(
 
Panel A: Small firms 
t α0 α1 α2 R
2 N 
1 -0.1180  0.0245  0.0030  
0.4781  569 
t-value -2.0305**  1.5469  0.0436  
2 0.0884  -0.0456  0.0428  
0.3216  365 
t-value 2.6883*  -1.5411  0.3894  
Panel B: Large firms 
1 0.1312  0.0011  0.0739  
0.1880  31619 
t-value 1.3399  0.4704  0.2256  
2 -0.0502  0.0063  -0.1692  
0.0902  18817 
t-value -0.3730  0.4862  -0.3251  
Panel C: Whole sample 
1 0.1143  0.0246  0.0653  
0.1888  32188 
t-value 1.2168  0.9514  0.1991  
2 -0.0477  0.0091  -0.1918  
0.0897  19182 
t-value -0.3874  0.8003  -0.3735  
This table reports estimates of regressions relating raw earnings changes to dividend changes. 
DFE0 is equal to ROE0 -E [ROE0], where E [ROE0] is the fitted value from the cross-sectional 
regression of ROE0 on the logarithm of the total assets in year -1, the logarithm of the market-
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to-book ratio of equity in year-1, and ROE-1. CE0 is equal to (E0-E-1)/B-1. NDFED0 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is negative; it is 0 otherwise. PDFED0 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is positive and 0 otherwise. NCED0 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is negative and 0 otherwise. PCED0 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is positive and 0 otherwise. R
2
 is the average 
(adjusted) R
2
 of the cross-sectional regressions. *, ** and *** denote significant difference 
from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results of nonlinear model are shown in table 5. Similar to the results of 
second linear model, in all the three panels, the coefficients of dividend increase 
group and dividend decrease group are not statistically significant. Consequently, 
the ICD hypothesis is not valid in the Norwegian non-listed firms. 
 
Overall, both the linear and nonlinear models demonstrate that the Norwegian 
non-listed firms do not support the ICD hypothesis. And we interpret this finding 
as follows. 
i. The survey conducted by Kent, Tarun and Ohannes (2005) reports that 
compared to the managers in US, Norwegian managers more concern 
about the legal rules and constraints when setting dividend policies. On the 
other hand, Norway government is likely to implement strict regulars and 
constrains to protect the stockholders‟ rights. Therefore, we believe the 
current business regulations in Norway make the ICD hypothesis invalid 
for non-listed firms. 
ii. Before the Norwegian tax reform in 2006, the tax rate on dividend is lower 
than on the earned income, so the managers in Norway have high incentive 
to shift the earned income as the dividend income. And the reform was 
announced in advance, and certain rules were implemented from 2004, so 
managers would advance shifting the earned income. As we can see in the 
figure 1, the average dividend payment per firm increases sharply from 
2004 to 2005, even although the further earnings of firms may reduce. In 
short, the dual income tax system before 2006 reduces the effect of ICD in 
Norway. 
Dividend Changes and Firm Performance                                               01.09.2011                                                                                                                                      
 22 
4.3 ICD on Tax Reform 
4.3.1 Analysis before and after tax reform 
Considering that Norway implement a tax reform which increase the dividend 
taxation from 2004 to 2006, and there is a strong timing effects on dividend 
payments in 2004 and 2005, we break up our whole sample into two periods: 
1998-2003 and 2006-2009, before the announcement of tax reform and after the 
implementation of the tax reform respectively. It is interesting to test the ICD 
hypothesis under different tax reforms. 
 
Here we just test the results of these two periods based on the equation (3) and 
equation (4), linear model and nonlinear model respectively. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of linear model. In panel A (small firms), for t=1, the 
coefficient of dividend decrease α2 is positive and significant for the first period 
(1999-2003). For t=2, both the coefficients on dividend increase and dividend 
decrease are negative and statistically significant, but the coefficient on dividend 
increase is quite small, only -0.0174. On the other hand, panel B (large firms) and 
panel C (whole sample) show that the coefficients on dividend changes are not 
statistically significant. This result indicates before the new tax system was 
announced, dividend decreases in Norwegian small non-listed firms are predictive 
of further earnings for the following two years and there is a negative and weak 
relation between dividend increases and further earnings in the second following 
year. However, ICD hypothesis still does not work in Norwegian non-listed 
market. 
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Table 6 
Cross-sectional regressions of the future earnings change, deflated by the book value, on 
the dividend change and control variables for two periods 1998-2003 and 2006-2009 
tt
tt
ROE
BEEDIVRDNCDIVRDPCBEE



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

14
11030201011 /)()()(/)(
 
Panel A: Small firms 
T α0 α1 α2 R
2
 N 
1 
1999-2003 -0.0202  -0.0032  0.1106  
0.3698  447  
t-value -0.3816  -0.3890  1.6803*** 
2006-2008 -0.3995  1.4327  0.9042  
0.6749  19  
t-value -4.1768* 1.5742  0.2913  
2 
1999-2003 0.1310  -0.0174  -0.3482  
0.2389  322 
t-value 2.0025** -2.0920** -2.2217** 
2006-2007 -0.0149  0.1725  -3.6685  
NA 8 
t-value -0.0724  0.2590  -0.9400  
Panel B: Large firms 
1 
1999-2003 0.4040  0.0050  0.1259  
0.1828  29379 
t-value 1.2337  0.7800  0.8200  
2006-2008 0.0850  0.0015  -0.4033  
0.0876  1426 
t-value 1.6387  0.4436  -1.4519  
2 
1999-2003 -0.0708  -0.0082  -0.2726  
0.0479  18254 
t-value -0.1900  -0.7615  -1.0167  
2006-2007 0.2894  -0.0235  0.4954  
0.0736  505 
t-value 0.7467  -0.9008  0.5098  
Panel C: Whole sample 
1 
1999-2003 0.3965  0.0042  0.1231  
0.1827  29826 
t-value 1.2370  0.6611  0.8046  
2006-2008 0.0814  0.0016  -0.4070  
0.0879  1445 
t-value 1.6465*** 0.4628  -1.4438  
2 
1999-2003 -0.0775  -0.0060  -0.2745  
0.0480  18576 
t-value -0.2133  -0.5873  -1.0571  
2006-2007 0.2644  -0.0205  0.4574  
0.0687  513 
t-value 0.7301  -0.8891  0.4915  
This table reports estimates of regressions relating raw earnings changes to dividend changes. 
R
2
 is the average (adjusted) R
2
 of the cross-sectional regressions. *, ** and *** denote 
significant difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results of nonlinear model are shown in Table 7. For panel A (small firms) 
shows that the coefficients for both the dividend increase and dividend decrease 
are not statistically significant while for panel B (large firms) and panel C, the 
coefficients of dividend decrease in the second period, after tax reform. The result 
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demonstrates that for large Norwegian non-listed firm and entire non-listed 
market, there is negative relationship between changes in dividend decrease and 
further earning after the tax reform and this relationship only last for next one year. 
 
Table 7 
Nonlinear regressions of the future earnings change, deflated by the book value, on the 
dividend change for two periods 1998-2003 and 2003-2009 
 
 t
tt
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Panel A: Small firms 
T α0 α1 α2 R
2 N 
1 
99-03 -0.0988  0.0049  0.0207  
0.4528  413 
t-value -2.8648*  0.9121  0.2082  
06-08 NA NA NA 
NA     NA 
t-value NA NA NA 
2 
99-03 0.0669  -0.0177  -0.0082  
0.3827  293 
t-value 2.1974**  -1.4604  -0.0688  
06-07 NA NA NA 
NA NA 
t-value NA NA NA 
Panel B: Large firms 
1 
99-03 0.1233  -0.0004  0.4142  
0.1964   28432 
t-value 0.6060  -0.1960  0.6427  
06-08 0.1350  0.0000  -0.2575  
0.1126  1425 
t-value 2.0395* 0.0056  -2.0265** 
2 
99-03 -0.0266  -0.0110  -0.5705  
0.0473  17432 
t-value -0.1321  -1.1082  -0.6337  
06-07 -0.3137  0.0513  0.1692  
0.2317  504 
t-value -0.8979  1.0780  0.2045  
Panel C: Whole sample 
1 
99-03 0.1169  -0.0014  0.4196  
0.1963    28845 
t-value 0.5958  -1.2576  0.6519  
06-08 0.1279  0.0001  -0.2585  
0.1129    1444 
t-value 2.0992** 0.0341  -1.9747* 
2 
99-03 -0.0295  -0.0049  -0.5838  
0.0476     17725 
t-value -0.1551  -0.5868  -0.6549  
06-07 -0.2681  0.0474  0.1406  
0.2271      512 
t-value -0.8792  1.0846  0.1761  
This table reports estimates of regressions relating raw earnings changes to dividend changes. 
R
2 
is the average (adjusted) R
2
 of the cross-sectional regressions. *, ** and *** denote 
significant difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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The results of linear model and nonlinear models are quite different, but we 
believe the results of nonlinear model are trustier, because the nonlinear model 
has higher R-squares. Besides, some papers find the mean reversion in accounting 
profitability for Norwegian non-listed firms (see Knell Bjorn Nodal and Randi 
Naps, 2009). What‟s more, the number of small firms in our sample is somewhat 
less, as we see in the tables of regression results, which mean that the negative 
relationship in the small firms indicated by linear model is not somewhat valid. 
Furthermore, before the tax reform, the firms‟ managers are more likely to 
minimize the tax payment by shifting the earned income as dividend income, 
which is documented by Sorensen (1994), Hagen and Sorensen (1998), Lind the 
et.al (2004), and Alstadsæter (2007). Thus, we expect that changes in dividend 
before tax reform do not contain managers‟ expectations of further earning and 
the results of nonlinear model more fit our expectation. 
 
However, the nonlinear model presents a negative relationship between dividend 
decreases and further earning changes, but the ICD hypothesis imply to a positive 
relationship. Therefore ICD hypothesis is not valid in both periods and we 
interpret the negative relationship after tax reform as follows: 
i. Dividends decrease may be result from the low earnings in previous year 
rather than the expectation of further earnings. 
ii. The purpose of decreasing the dividends payment is for firms‟ 
reinvestment which will boom the further earning.  
 
4.3.2 Analysis on special years 
At last, we are also quite interested to test the ICD hypothesis in 2004 and 2005 in 
which these is a strong timing effect of dividend resulted from the announcement 
of tax reform. Since Norway approved a temporary tax on capital gains and 
dividends in 2001, we take account of 2001 as well. 
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Table 8 presents the results of linear model. In Panel A (small firms), the 
coefficients on dividend increase are positive and significant in 2001 and 2005 
while the coefficient on dividend decrease is positive and significant in 2001. 
Only the dividend decrease coefficient in Panel B (large firms) is significant in 
2004. For Panel C (whole sample), α1 is positive and significant in 2005 and α2 is 
negative and significant in 2004. Thus, in 2001, ICD hypothesis is valid for 
Norwegian small non-listed firms and the dividend decreases convey more 
information. In 2004, only dividend decreases have negative relationship to 
further earning for Norwegian large non-listed firms and whole non-listed market. 
Opposite, only dividend increases convey information in 2005 for small firms and 
whole sample, which supports the ICD hypothesis.  
 
Table 8 
Summary statistics from cross-sectional regression of the future earnings change, 
deflated by the book value, on the dividend change in 2001, 2004 and 2005 
tt
tt
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  2001 2004 2005 
Panel A small firms 
α1 0.0166 (2.0472**) 0.0187 (0.1000) 0.3703 (16.4577*) 
α2 0.3706 (2.0340**) 0.2165 (0.5918) -0.3117 (-1.1288) 
Panel B large firms 
α1 -0.0052 (-0.2068 ) -0.0037 (-0.4310)  0.0784 (1.1690) 
α2 -0.0580 (-0.0274) -0.4612 (-2.4715**) 0.0968 (0.4184) 
Panel C whole sample 
α1 -0.0050 (-0.1992) -0.0033 (-0.3907) 0.2476 (8.6196*) 
α2 -0.0688 (-0.0331)  -0.3822 (-2.1896**) -0.1225 (-0.5985) 
This table only reports the results at t=1, since there is no significant coefficients of α1 and α2 
at t=2 in 2001, 2004 and 2005. *, ** and *** denote significant difference from zero at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results of nonlinear model are displayed in table 9. Similar to the results of 
linear model, in 2001, only Norwegian small non-listed firms support the ICD 
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hypothesis, but only dividend increases contain the information of further 
earnings. In 2004, the dividend decreases in Norwegian large non-listed firms and 
whole non-listed market also negative relate to further earning and ICD 
hypothesis does not work. In 2005, the dividend increases support the ICD 
hypothesis only for entire non-listed market. 
 
Table 9 
Summary statistics from nonlinear regressions of the future earnings change, deflated 
by the book value, on the dividend change in 2001, 2004 and 2005 
 
 t
tt
CECEPCEDCENCEDNCED
DFEDFEPDFEDDFENDFEDNDFED
DIVRDNCDIVRDPCBEE




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 
）004003021
0004003021
02001011
(
/)(
 
  2001 2004 2005 
Panel A small firms 
α1 0.0261 (1.7653***) 0.1137 (0.6377) 0.0334 (0.9268） 
α2 0.2798 (0.6796) (-0.0540) (-0.1450) (-0.0281) (-0.1655) 
Panel B large firms 
α1 (-0.0050) (-0.1999) (-0.0044) (-0.5408) 0.0169 (0.3024 ) 
α2 2.9441 (1.1621) (-0.5083) (-2.3750**) (-0.0507) (-0.2358) 
Panel C whole sample 
α1 (-0.0048) (-0.1932) (-0.0043) (-0.5452) 0.2567 (8.8710*) 
α2 2.9483 (1.1850) (-0.4106) (-2.0912**) (-0.2590) (-1.3017) 
This table only reports the results at t=1, since there is no significant coefficients of α1 and α2 
at t=2 in 2001, 2004 and 2005. *, ** and *** denote significant difference from zero at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results are so surprising. We expected that ICD hypothesis is not valid in 
these three years, since the dividend changes may owing to the responses of 
managers to the changes of dividend taxation, rather than because of the further 
expectation of managers. However, the regression results of both linear model and 
nonlinear model demonstrate that ICD hypothesis is valid in 2001 for small non-
listed firms and in 2005 for the entire non-listed market. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the validity of the ICD hypothesis for the Norwegian 
non-listed firms during 1994-2009.  
 
We conduct our study using the linear model employed by Nissim and Ziv (2001) 
and nonlinear model of earnings expectations employed by Grullon et al. (2005). 
However, the results of both models do not provide any evidence to support ICD 
hypothesis for the entire sample, which are quite different from the results of 
Nissim and Ziv (2001), but similar to that of Grullon et al. (2005).  
  
The linear and nonlinear models also demonstrate that ICD hypothesis is not valid 
for both Norwegian small non-listed firms and Norwegian large non-listed firms. 
But the initial linear model presents that dividend changes negatively relate with 
future earnings for large firms. However, there is a problem associated with 
residual cross-correlations in this initial model, so we conclude that there is no 
significant relationship between dividend changes and further earnings for large 
and small Norwegian non-listed firms. 
 
Taking into account the tax reform in Norway from 2004 to 2006, we split the 
whole period into two periods: 1998-2003 and 2006-2009 to test the ICD 
hypothesis under different tax systems. There is one-year negative relationship 
between dividend decreases and further earnings after the tax reform for entire 
sample and large Norwegian non-listed firm under the nonlinear model. However, 
the ICD hypothesis is still not valid in both tax systems since the ICD hypothesis 
imply to a positive relationship. 
 
When we test the relation between dividend changes and further earnings changes 
in 2001, 2004, and 2005, since these three years involve certain transitions of 
dividend taxation reform, we expected that the transitory rules would disturbances 
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the dividend policies and make the ICD hypothesis invalid, however, the results 
are surprising, ICD valid for small non-listed firms in 2001 and for the entire 
sample in 2005.  
 
In conclusion, our results demonstrate that the ICD hypothesis is not valid during 
1998 to 2009 for Norwegian non-listed firms, but valid in 2001 for small firms 
and in 2005 for non-listed market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dividend Changes and Firm Performance                                               01.09.2011                                                                                                                                      
 30 
References 
Aharony, Joseph and Itzhak Swary. 1980. "Quarterly dividend and earnings 
announcements and stockholders‟ returns: An empirical analysis." Journal of 
Finance, 35 (1): 1–12. 
Aivazian, V., Booth, L. and Cleary, S.. 2003. "Dividend policy and the 
organization of capital markets." Journal of Multinational financial management, 
13 (2): 101-121.  
Alstadsæter, Annette and Fjærli, Erik. 2009. "Neutral Taxation of Shareholder 
Income? Corporate Responses to an Announced Dividend Tax." CESifo Working 
paper Series, No. 2530. 
Asquith, Paul and David W. Mullins, Jr.. 1983. "The impact of initiating dividend 
payments on shareholders‟ wealth." Journal of Business, 56 (1): 77–96. 
Bajaj, Mukesh and Anand M. Vijh. 1990. "Dividend clienteles and the 
information content of dividend changes." Journal of Financial Economics, 26 
(2): 193–219. 
Benartzi, S., R. Michaely and R. Thaler. 1997. "Do changes in dividends signal 
the future or the past?" Journal of Finance, 52 (3): 1007–1034. 
Bhattacharya, S. 1979. "Imperfect information, dividend policy, and “the bird in 
the hand” fallacy." Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1): 259–270. 
Brooks, Y., Charlton, W.T.Jr. and Hendershott, R.J.. 1998. "Do Firm use 
Dividends to Signal Large Future Cash Flow Increases." Financial Management, 
27 (3): 46-57.  
DeAngelo, Harry, Linda DeAngelo and Douglas J. Skinner. 1996. "Reversal of 
fortune: Dividend signaling and the disappearance of sustained earnings growth." 
Journal of Financial Economics, 40 (3): 341–371. 
DeAngeloa, Harry, Linda DeAngeloa and Rene M. Stulz. 2006. "Dividend policy 
and the earned/contributed capital mix: a test of the life-cycle theory." Journal of 
Financial Economics, 81 (2): 227–254. 
Dividend Changes and Firm Performance                                               01.09.2011                                                                                                                                      
 31 
Dielman, T. E. and H. R. Oppenheimer. 1984. "An examination of investor 
behavior during periods of large dividend changes." Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 19 (2): 197–216. 
Fama, E., French, K., 2001. "Disappearing dividends: changing firm 
characteristics or lower propensity to pay?" Journal of Financial Economics, 60 
(1): 3–43. 
Fama, E. F., and J. D. MacBeth. 1973. "Risk, return and equilibrium: empirical 
tests." Journal of Political Economy, 81 (3): 607–636. 
Farzad Farsio, Amanda Geary and Justin Moser. 2004. "The Relationship 
Between Dividends and Earnings." Journal for Economic Educators, 4 (4):1-5 
Goergen, M., Renneboog, L. and Correia da Silva, L. 2005. "When do German 
firms change their dividends?" Journal of Corporate Finance, 11 (1-2): 375-399. 
Gonedes, Nicholas J. 1978. "Corporate signaling, external accounting, and capital 
market equilibrium: Evidence on dividends, income, and extraordinary items." 
Journal of Accounting Research, 16 (1): 26-79. 
Grullon, Gustavo, Roni Michaely and Bhaskaram Swaminathan. 2002. "Are 
dividend changes a sign of firm maturity?" Journal of Business, 75 (3): 387-424. 
Grullon, G., R. Michaely, S. Benartzi and R. Thaler. 2005. "Dividend changes do 
not signal changes in future profitability." Journal of Business 78 (5): 1659–1682. 
Hansen, L. P., and R. J. Hodrick. 1980. "Forward exchange rates as optimal 
predictors of future spot rates: an econometric analysis." Journal of Political 
Economy, 88 (5): 829–853. 
Healy, P. M. and K. G. Palepu. 1988. "Earnings information conveyed by 
dividend initiations and omissions." Journal of Financial Economics, 21 (2): 
149–175. 
Dividend Changes and Firm Performance                                               01.09.2011                                                                                                                                      
 32 
H. Kent Baker, Tarun K. Mukherjee and Ohannes George Paskelian. 2006. "How 
Norwegian managers view dividend policy." Global Finance Journal, 17 (1): 
155–176. 
John, Kose and Joseph Williams. 1985. "Dividends, dilution, and taxes: A 
signaling equilibrium." Journal of Finance, 40 (4): 1053-1070. 
Kale, J.R. and Noe, T.H. 1990. "Dividends, uncertainty and underwriting costs 
under asymmetric information." The Journal of Financial Research, 13 (4): 265-
277. 
Koch, P. D. and Shenoy, C. 1999. "The Information Content of Dividend and 
Capital Structure Policies." Financial Management, 28 (4): 16-35. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny. 2000. "Agency 
problems and dividend policies around the world." Journal of Finance, 55 (1): 
1–33. 
Lintner, J. 1956. "Distribution of income of corporations among dividends, 
retained earnings and taxes." American Economic Review, 60: 1–40. 
Miller, M. H. and F. Modigliani. 1961. "Dividend policy, growth, and the 
valuation of shares." Journal of Business, 34 (4): 411–433. 
Miller, M. H. and Rock, K. 1985. "Dividend policy under asymmetric 
information." Journal of Finance, 40 (4): 1031–1051. 
Nissim, D. and A. Ziv. 2001. "Dividend changes and future profitability." Journal 
of Finance, 56 (6): 2111–2133. 
Penman, Stephen H.. 1983. "The predictive content of earnings forecasts and 
dividends." Journal of Finance, 38 (4): 1181-1199. 
Pettit, R. R.. 1972. "Dividend announcements, security performance, and capital 
market efficiency." Journal of Finance, 27 (5): 993–1007. 
Tse, C-B. 2005. "Use Dividends to Signal or Not: An examination of the UK 
Dividend Payout Patterns." Managerial Finance, 31 (4): 12-33. 
Dividend Changes and Firm Performance                                               01.09.2011                                                                                                                                      
 33 
Watts, R.. 1973. "The information content of dividends." Journal of Business, 46 
(2): 191–211. 
Young M. Choi, HyoK. Ju and YoungK. Park. 2011. "Do dividend changes 
predict the future profitability of firms?" Accounting & Finance: 1-23. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-629X.2010.00379.x              
Dividend Changes and Firm Performance                                               01.09.2011                                                                                                                                      
 34 
 
Appendix 
Table 1 
Annual statistics from basic regression of future earnings change, deflated by the book value, on the dividend change and control variables (t=1) 
This table reports estimates of regressions relating raw earnings changes to dividend changes. Et denotes the earnings before extraordinary items in 
year t (year 0 is the event year). B-1 denotes the book value of equity at the end of year -1. RΔDIV0 denotes the annual percentage change in the cash 
dividend payment in year 0. ROEt-1 equals the earnings before extraordinary items in year t = 1 scaled by the book value of equity at the end of year t = 
1. R2 is the average (adjusted) R2 of the cross-sectional regressions. *, ** and *** denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
tttt ROEDIVRBEE    1201011 /)(      
Panel A: Small firms 
 1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
α0 -0.1700  0.0192  -0.1333  0.0677  0.0840  0.1784  0.1297  -0.2480  -0.0171  NA 
SD 0.0387  0.0366  0.0428  0.0395  0.0362  0.0956  0.1213  0.1919  0.1465  NA 
t-value -4.3941*  0.5246  -3.1142*  1.7148***  2.3223**  1.8665***  1.0697  -1.2923  -0.1166  NA 
p-value 0.0000  0.6012  0.0027  0.0895  0.0223  0.0666  0.2886  0.2323  0.9145  NA 
α1 -0.0002  -0.0245  0.0193  -0.0021  -0.0003  0.0989  0.2629  0.8256  -0.3169  NA 
SD 0.0003  0.0359  0.0081  0.0148  0.0043  0.1235  0.0182  0.3140  0.2442  NA 
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Table 1 (continued)         
t-value -0.5953  -0.6827  2.3785**  -0.1429  -0.0615  0.8008  14.4442*  2.6297*  -1.2976  NA 
p-value 0.5535  0.4965  0.0203  0.8867  0.9511  0.4262  0.0000  0.0302  0.2852  NA 
α2 -0.0077  -0.0005  -0.0093  -0.0016  -0.0014  -0.0019  -0.0036  0.0045  0.0049  NA 
SD 0.0005  0.0005  0.0005  0.0005  0.0005  0.0011  0.0013  0.0019  0.0013  NA 
t-value -15.7226*  -1.0090  -19.2699*  -2.9145*  -3.0550*  -1.7668***  -2.7060*  2.3882**  3.8631*  NA 
p-value 0.0000  0.3157  0.0000  0.0044  0.0029  0.0820  0.0086  0.0440  0.0307  NA 
R2 0.7730  -0.0050  0.8487  0.0606  0.0684  0.0248  0.8168  0.4985  0.7380  NA 
Panel B: Large firms 
α0 -0.0896  0.1424  1.6742  0.1757  0.3391  0.4188  0.1115  0.3678  0.1275  -0.0547  
SD 0.0383  0.0219  0.5042  0.0149  0.0186  0.0569  0.0959  0.1189  0.0633  0.0658  
t-value -2.3390**  6.4895*  3.3203*  11.7798*  18.2136*  7.3654*  1.1627  3.0944*  2.0140**  -0.8315  
p-value 0.0194  0.0000  0.0009  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.2453  0.0022  0.0445  0.4060  
α1 -0.0127  -0.0442  -0.0049  -0.0018  -0.0173  -0.0200  -0.0240  -0.0110  -0.0112  -0.0091  
SD 0.0036  0.0103  0.0249  0.0012  0.0034  0.0086  0.0588  0.0189  0.0067  0.0101  
t-value -3.5733*  -4.2960*  -0.1975  -1.5500  -5.0937*  -2.3190**  -0.4093  -0.5858  -1.6680***  -0.8975  
p-value 0.0004  0.0000  0.8434  0.1212  0.0000  0.0206  0.6824  0.5586  0.0959  0.3698  
α2 -0.0093  -0.0016  -0.0010  -0.0019  -0.0018  -0.0011  0.0018  0.0004  -0.0008  0.0002  
SD 0.0003  0.0002  0.0044  0.0001  0.0001  0.0003  0.0007  0.0008  0.0005  0.0125  
t-value -29.1386*  -7.8687*  -0.2199  -17.1113*  -13.5879*  -3.4313*  2.6554*  0.5068  -1.6797***  0.0134  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.8260  0.0000  0.0000  0.0006  0.0081  0.6128  0.0936  0.9893  
R2 0.1636  0.0167  -0.0004  0.0413  0.0255  0.0156  0.0061  -0.0062  0.0064  -0.0018  
Panel C: Whole sample 
α0 -0.0969  0.1401  1.6408  0.1736  0.3351  0.3925  0.1263  0.3521  0.1254  -0.0546  
SD 0.0376  0.0215  0.4960  0.0147  0.0184  0.0529  0.0887  0.1137  0.0626  0.0656  
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Table 1 (continued)         
t-value -2.5760**  6.5035*  3.3078*  11.8266*  18.2368*  7.4158*  1.4239  3.0977*  2.0026**  -0.8320  
p-value 0.0100  0.0000  0.0009  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.1548  0.0022  0.0457  0.4057  
α1 -0.0031  -0.0442  -0.0047  -0.0018  -0.0168  -0.0189  0.1557  -0.0105  -0.0113  -0.0091  
SD 0.0017  0.0102  0.0247  0.0012  0.0033  0.0084  0.0281  0.0185  0.0067  0.0101  
t-value -1.8379***  -4.3442*  -0.1902  -1.5510  -5.0598 * -2.2516**  5.5472 * -0.5658  -1.6813***  -0.8995  
p-value 0.0661  0.0000  0.8492  0.1210  0.0000  0.0246  0.0000  0.5720  0.0933  0.3687  
α2 -0.0093  -0.0016  -0.0010  -0.0019  -0.0018  -0.0010  0.0015  0.0005  -0.0007  0.0002  
SD 0.0003  0.0002  0.0043  0.0001  0.0001  0.0003  0.0006  0.0008  0.0005  0.0124  
t-value -29.6945*  -7.9027*  -0.2210  -17.2211*  -13.6227*  -3.3952* 2.2882**  0.6331  -1.6027  0.0185  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.8251  0.0000  0.0000  0.0007  0.0224  0.5273  0.1096  0.9853  
R2 0.1627  0.0166  -0.0004  0.0412  0.0253  0.0141  0.0455  -0.0054  0.0059  -0.0018  
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Table 2  
Annual statistics from basic regression of future earnings change, deflated by the book value, on the dividend change and control variables (t=2) 
This table reports estimates of regressions relating raw earnings changes to dividend changes. Et denotes the earnings before extraordinary items in 
year t (year 0 is the event year). B-1 denotes the book value of equity at the end of year -1. RΔDIV0 denotes the annual percentage change in the cash 
dividend payment in year 0. ROEt-1 equals the earnings before extraordinary items in year t = 1 scaled by the book value of equity at the end of year t = 
1. R2 is the average (adjusted) R2 of the cross-sectional regressions. *, ** and *** denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
tttt ROEDIVRBEE    1201011 /)(       
Panel A: Small firms 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
α0 0.1761  0.0619  0.5299  0.0436  0.0667  0.2500  0.1508  0.1237  NA 
SD 0.0845  0.0773  0.1838  0.0302  0.0482  0.1001  0.2558  0.2457  NA 
t-value 2.0839**  0.8003  2.8836*  1.4422  1.3860  2.4967**  0.5894  0.5036  NA 
p-value 0.0414  0.4263  0.0058  0.1533  0.1716  0.0159  0.5718  0.6645  NA 
α1 0.0004  -0.0010  -0.0287  0.0014  0.0041  -0.1213  -0.5533  -1.3188  NA 
SD 0.0006  0.0766  0.0609  0.0121  0.0291  0.1120  0.5056  1.1409  NA 
t-value 0.6734  -0.0127  -0.4711  0.1137  0.1412  -1.0829  -1.0943  -1.1560  NA 
p-value 0.5032  0.9899  0.6397  0.9098  0.8883  0.2840  0.3057  0.3671  NA 
α2 0.0080  -0.0007  0.0006  -0.0001  -0.0011  -0.0041  0.0023  0.0029  NA 
SD 0.0010  0.0009  0.0013  0.0004  0.0005  0.0010  0.0026  0.0019  NA 
t-value 8.4419*  -0.7998  0.4289  -0.3279  -2.0946**  -4.2575*  0.8712  1.4905  NA 
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Table 2 (continued)       
p-value 0.0000  0.4267  0.6699  0.7439  0.0410  0.0001  0.4090  0.2746  NA 
R2 0.5246  -0.0201  -0.0316  -0.0243  0.0418  0.2509  0.0654  0.6308  NAs 
Panel B: Large firms 
α0 0.3234  0.1834  -1.3837  0.2725  0.3655  0.0520  0.5563  0.5008  -0.0441  
SD 0.0360  0.0199  0.6108  0.0199  0.0661  0.0914  0.1818  0.1994  0.0970  
t-value 8.9956*  9.1971*  -2.2655**  13.6918*  5.5263*  0.5688  3.0597*  2.5116**  -0.4542  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0235  0.0000  0.0000  0.5697  0.0025  0.0137  0.6499  
α1 0.0326  0.0046  0.0091  0.0009  -0.0265  0.0042  0.0383  -0.0774  0.0011  
SD 0.0082  0.0106  0.0463  0.0014  0.0272  0.0118  0.1030  0.0779  0.0067  
t-value 3.9875*  0.4343  0.1964  0.6506  -0.9719  0.3556  0.3721  -0.9940  0.1624  
p-value 0.0001  0.6641  0.8443  0.5153  0.3315  0.7222  0.7102  0.3227  0.8711  
α2 0.0076  -0.0022  -0.0054  -0.0015  -0.0005  0.0016  0.0004  -0.0043  -0.0072  
SD 0.0003  0.0002  0.0055  0.0001  0.0003  0.0006  0.0014  0.0013  0.0184  
t-value 22.2230*  -12.6711*  -0.9680  -10.9208*  -1.5755  2.7692*  0.2516  -3.2360*  -0.3940  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.3331  0.0000  0.1156  0.0058  0.8016  0.0017  0.6938  
R2 0.1193  0.0351  -0.0003  0.0202  0.0018  0.0085  -0.0082  0.0908  -0.0045  
Panel C: Whole sample 
α0 0.3456  0.1814  -1.3605  0.2686  0.3311  0.0546  0.5302  0.4780  -0.0443  
SD 0.0348  0.0197  0.6023  0.0196  0.0606  0.0844  0.1733  0.1903  0.0963  
t-value 9.9279*  9.2290*  -2.2588**  13.7028*  5.4651*  0.6467  3.0591*  2.5118**  -0.4594  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0240  0.0000  0.0000  0.5180  0.0025  0.0136  0.6462  
α1 0.0015  0.0045  0.0084  0.0010  -0.0249  0.0043  0.0335  -0.0810  0.0011  
SD 0.0016  0.0105  0.0459  0.0014  0.0257  0.0114  0.1004  0.0762  0.0067  
t-value 0.9404  0.4255  0.1833  0.6706  -0.9702  0.3767  0.3340  -1.0630  0.1601  
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Table 2 (continued)       
p-value 0.3471  0.6705  0.8546  0.5025  0.3323  0.7065  0.7387  0.2903  0.8729  
α2 0.0077  -0.0022  -0.0051  -0.0015  -0.0004  0.0014  0.0005  -0.0040  -0.0070  
SD 0.0003  0.0002  0.0054  0.0001  0.0003  0.0005  0.0014  0.0013  0.0182  
t-value 22.9435*  -12.7151*  -0.9449  -10.9128*  -1.4051  2.6267**  0.3444  -3.1100*  -0.3825  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.3448  0.0000  0.1604  0.0088  0.7309  0.0024  0.7023  
R2 0.1175  0.0348  -0.0003  0.0199  0.0010  0.0068  -0.0076  0.0816  -0.0045  
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Table 3 
Annual statistics from asymmetric regression of future earnings change, deflated by the book value, on the dividend change and control variables (t=1) 
This table reports estimates of regressions relating raw earnings changes to dividend changes. Et denotes the earnings before extraordinary items in 
year t (year 0 is the event year). B-1 denotes the book value of equity at the end of year -1. RΔDIV0 denotes the annual percentage change in the cash 
dividend payment in year 0. ROEt-1 equals the earnings before extraordinary items in year t = 1 scaled by the book value of equity at the end of year t = 
1. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. R
2 
is the average (adjusted) R
2
 of the 
cross-sectional regressions. *, ** and *** denote significant difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
tttt ROEBEEDIVRDNCDIVRDPCBEE    1411030201011 /)()()(/)(
      
Panel A: Small firms 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
α0 -0.1904  0.0389  -0.0953  0.0572  0.0886  0.2285  -0.1633  -0.5166  -0.2823  NA 
SD 0.0359  0.0542  0.0483  0.0515  0.0443  0.1508  0.1139  0.2247  0.6986  NA 
t-value -5.2964*  0.7183  -1.9749**  1.1115  2.0003**  1.5155  -1.4330  -2.2994**  -0.4041  NA 
p-value 0.0000  0.4745  0.0527  0.2691  0.0483  0.1347  0.1566  0.0611  0.7555  NA 
α1 -0.0001  -0.0334  0.0166  0.0013  -0.0004  0.0187  0.3703  2.5474  0.3180  NA 
SD 0.0002  0.0484  0.0081  0.0161  0.0044  0.1870  0.0225  0.9495  1.3088  NA 
t-value -0.5126  -0.6889  2.0472**  0.0832  -0.0896  0.1000  16.4577*  2.6830*  0.2430  NA 
p-value 0.6099  0.4927  0.0448  0.9339  0.9288  0.9207  0.0000  0.0364  0.8482  NA 
α2 0.0138  0.0763  0.3706  0.0380  0.0541  0.2165  -0.3117  4.7066  -2.8981  NA 
SD 0.1249  0.1419  0.1822  0.1419  0.1310  0.3659  0.2761  5.1159  2.3534  NA 
t-value 0.1109  0.5375  2.0340**  0.2680  0.4127  0.5918  -1.1288  0.9200  -1.2315  NA 
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p-value 0.9120  0.5923  0.0462  0.7893  0.6807  0.5561  0.2631  0.3931  0.4342  NA 
α3 -0.7243  -0.1009  -0.2353  -0.2480  -0.0849  0.1180  -0.8175  -2.2059  2.3066  NA 
SD 0.1054  0.1200  0.1210  0.1155  0.0771  0.2497  0.1360  1.1364  3.0494  NA 
t-value -6.8731*  -0.8409  -1.9452***  -2.1481**  -1.1008  0.4728  -6.0085*  -1.9412***  0.7564  NA 
p-value 0.0000  0.4027  0.0562  0.0342  0.2737  0.6380  0.0000  0.1003  0.5877  NA 
α4 -0.0052  -0.0002  -0.0092  -0.0010  -0.0012  -0.0021  0.0007  0.0071  -0.0053  NA 
SD 0.0005  0.0006  0.0005  0.0006  0.0005  0.0011  0.0013  0.0033  0.0154  NA 
t-value -9.8020*  -0.3578  -18.9743*  -1.6655***  -2.5163**  -1.8297***  0.5426  2.1939**  -0.3457  NA 
p-value 0.0000  0.7214  0.0000  0.0990  0.0135  0.0721  0.5892  0.0707  0.7881  NA 
R2 0.8632  -0.0163  0.8560  0.0852  0.0609  0.0007  0.8852  0.5893  0.7604  NA 
Panel B: Large firms 
α0 -0.1528  0.1336  1.6891  0.1228  0.2274  0.2629  0.1561  0.1874  0.0485  0.0191  
SD 0.0370  0.0262  0.5802  0.0171  0.0242  0.0652  0.1425  0.1379  0.0712  0.0656  
t-value -4.1278*  5.1040*  2.9112*  7.1866*  9.4006*  4.0321*  1.0952  1.3587  0.6816  0.2918  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0036  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.2737  0.1756  0.4958  0.7705  
α1 0.0051  0.0295  -0.0052  -0.0003  -0.0042  -0.0037  0.0784  0.0048  -0.0053  0.0049  
SD 0.0030  0.0096  0.0251  0.0012  0.0034  0.0085  0.0671  0.0194  0.0066  0.0095  
t-value 1.7089***  3.0737*  -0.2068  -0.2317  -1.2521  -0.4310  1.1690  0.2501  -0.7954  0.5227  
p-value 0.0875  0.0021  0.8362  0.8168  0.2106  0.6666  0.2427  0.8027  0.4267  0.6014  
α2 0.6782  0.2446  -0.0580  -0.1114  -0.1238  -0.4612  0.0968  -0.9328  -0.2844  0.0072  
SD 0.1270  0.0526  2.1154  0.0515  0.0561  0.1866  0.2313  0.4206  0.2145  0.1428  
t-value 5.3391*  4.6513*  -0.0274  -2.1607**  -2.2053**  -2.4715**  0.4184  -2.2176**  -1.3262  0.0506  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.9781  0.0308  0.0275  0.0136  0.6758  0.0276  0.1853  0.9596  
α3 -0.9135  -0.6518  0.2184  -0.2532  -0.3522  -0.3105  -0.4847  -0.1594  -0.2513  -0.4004  
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SD 0.0204  0.0135  0.5978  0.0159  0.0158  0.0413  0.0548  0.0952  0.0450  0.0365  
t-value -44.8075*  -48.1959*  0.3653  -15.9736*  -22.3096*  -7.5094*  -8.8412*  -1.6742***  -5.5860*  -10.9614*  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.7149  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0955  0.0000  0.0000  
α4 -0.0051  0.0006  -0.0016  -0.0010  -0.0005  0.0002  0.0031  0.0016  0.0007  -0.0021  
SD 0.0003  0.0002  0.0047  0.0001  0.0001  0.0003  0.0007  0.0009  0.0005  0.0114  
t-value -17.6990*  3.0703*  -0.3343  -8.7946*  -3.6489*  0.7503  4.4470*  1.7268***  1.3615  -0.1849  
p-value 0.0000  0.0021  0.7381  0.0000  0.0003  0.4533  0.0000  0.0856  0.1739  0.8534  
R2 0.4222  0.3180  -0.0009  0.0841  0.0907  0.0919  0.0907  0.0250  0.0679  0.1698  
Panel C: Whole sample 
α0 -0.1484  0.1305  1.6544  0.1214  0.2247  0.2545  -0.0038  0.1790  0.0465  0.0188  
SD 0.0363  0.0256  0.5706  0.0168  0.0238  0.0613  0.1207  0.1304  0.0704  0.0653  
t-value -4.0891*  5.0895*  2.8992*  7.2155*  9.4286*  4.1548*  -0.0313  1.3728  0.6598  0.2875  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0038  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.9750  0.1711  0.5096  0.7738  
α1 0.0011  0.0295  -0.0050  -0.0003  -0.0041  -0.0033  0.2476  0.0052  -0.0053  0.0049  
SD 0.0014  0.0095  0.0249  0.0011  0.0033  0.0083  0.0287  0.0189  0.0066  0.0094  
t-value 0.7522  3.1002*  -0.1992  -0.2251  -1.2543  -0.3907  8.6196*  0.2753  -0.8036  0.5184  
p-value 0.4520  0.0019  0.8421  0.8219  0.2098  0.6961  0.0000  0.7833  0.4220  0.6043  
α2 0.6740  0.2417  -0.0688  -0.1085  -0.1227  -0.3822  -0.1225  -0.9452  -0.2829  0.0073  
SD 0.1249  0.0518  2.0812  0.0508  0.0555  0.1745  0.2046  0.4083  0.2117  0.1425  
t-value 5.3947*  4.6694*  -0.0331  -2.1374**  -2.2129 ** -2.1896**  -0.5985  -2.3151**  -1.3361  0.0509  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.9736  0.0326  0.0269  0.0288  0.5496  0.0215  0.1821  0.9594  
α3 -0.9096  -0.6513  0.2224  -0.2536  -0.3517  -0.3099  -0.4936  -0.1553  -0.2513  -0.4004  
SD 0.0201  0.0134  0.5921  0.0157  0.0157  0.0401  0.0526  0.0929  0.0448  0.0365  
t-value -45.2733*  -48.5675*  0.3756  -16.1263*  -22.4382*  -7.7253*  -9.3798*  -1.6721***  -5.6091*  -10.9816*  
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p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.7073  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0958  0.0000  0.0000  
α4 -0.0050  0.0006  -0.0016  -0.0010  -0.0005  0.0002  0.0032  0.0017  0.0007  -0.0020  
SD 0.0003  0.0002  0.0046  0.0001  0.0001  0.0003  0.0006  0.0009  0.0005  0.0113  
t-value -17.8966*  3.1928*  -0.3378  -8.8332*  -3.6403*  0.7852  4.9940*  1.8278 * 1.4571  -0.1755  
p-value 0.0000  0.0014  0.7355  0.0000  0.0003  0.4325  0.0000  0.0688  0.1457  0.8608  
R2 0.4224  0.3174  -0.0008  0.0840  0.0904  0.0862  0.1350  0.0265  0.0674  0.1698  
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Table 4  
Annual statistics from asymmetric regression of future earnings change, deflated by the book value, on the dividend change and control variables (t=2) 
This table reports estimates of regressions relating raw earnings changes to dividend changes. Et denotes the earnings before extraordinary items in 
year t (year 0 is the event year). B-1 denotes the book value of equity at the end of year -1. RΔDIV0 denotes the annual percentage change in the cash 
dividend payment in year 0. ROEt-1 equals the earnings before extraordinary items in year t = 1 scaled by the book value of equity at the end of year t = 
1. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. R
2 
is the average (adjusted) R
2
 of the 
cross-sectional regressions. *, ** and *** denote significant difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: Small firms 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
α0 0.1148  0.0515  0.3867  0.0294  0.0729  0.3730  -0.3805  -0.2212  0.1913  
SD 0.0872  0.1070  0.1719  0.0388  0.0542  0.1540  0.5919  NA NA 
t-value 1.3162  0.4812  2.2489**  0.7568  1.3456  2.4227**  -0.6428  NA NA 
p-value 0.1932  0.6320  0.0292  0.4515  0.1844  0.0192  0.5441  NA NA 
α1 0.0004  -0.0296  -0.0369  0.0044  -0.0256  -0.2682  0.5371  0.8386  -0.4936  
SD 0.0005  0.0966  0.0517  0.0135  0.0297  0.1664  1.3599  NA NA 
t-value 0.8675  -0.3067  -0.7128  0.3293  -0.8620  -1.6120  0.3949  NA NA 
p-value 0.3892  0.7600  0.4795  0.7429  0.3927  0.1135  0.7065  NA NA 
α2 -0.5264  -0.2138  -0.8755  -0.0732  -0.0521  0.2024  -2.1632  -7.5711  0.2340  
SD 0.3023  0.3219  0.6220  0.1182  0.1571  0.3636  1.7036  NA NA 
t-value -1.7415***  -0.6641  -1.4074  -0.6191  -0.3314  0.5567  -1.2698  NA NA 
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p-value 0.0868  0.5090  0.1659  0.5378  0.7417  0.5803  0.2512  NA NA 
α3 1.1169  0.4765  2.7762  0.0262  0.3139  0.1152  0.3451  -1.1472  NA 
SD 0.2331  0.1970  0.5541  0.0973  0.0784  0.2171  0.7973  NA NA 
t-value 4.7911*  2.4182**  5.0103*  0.2692  4.0037*  0.5306  0.4328  NA NA 
p-value 0.0000  0.0184  0.0000  0.7885  0.0002  0.5981  0.6803  NA NA 
α4 0.0051  -0.0019  0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0016  -0.0045  0.0042  0.0009  NA 
SD 0.0010  0.0010  0.0011  0.0005  0.0005  0.0010  0.0038  NA NA 
t-value 4.9077*  -1.9228***  0.1412  -0.3110  -3.2615* -4.4084*  1.0876  NA NA 
p-value 0.0000  0.0589  0.8883  0.7567  0.0020  0.0001  0.3185  NA NA 
R2 0.6483  0.0359  0.3022  -0.0453  0.2535  0.2437  -0.0645  NA NA 
Panel B: Large firms 
α0 0.3449  0.2252  -1.5558  0.2478  0.3840  0.0875  0.6000  0.6771  -0.0982  
SD 0.0401  0.0272  0.6942  0.0228  0.0826  0.1027  0.2788  0.2320  0.1016  
t-value 8.6060*  8.2715*  -2.2412**  10.8627*  4.6511*  0.8516  2.1519**  2.9183*  -0.9668  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0251  0.0000  0.0000  0.3947  0.0325  0.0044  0.3342  
α1 -0.0089  0.0042  0.0118  0.0010  -0.0489  0.0000  0.0507  -0.0496  0.0026  
SD 0.0085  0.0123  0.0468  0.0014  0.0303  0.0121  0.1207  0.0953  0.0068  
t-value -1.0447  0.3445  0.2512  0.7022  -1.6147  0.0000  0.4201  -0.5208  0.3825  
p-value 0.2962  0.7305  0.8017  0.4826  0.1068  1.0000  0.6749  0.6037  0.7023  
α2 -0.0082  0.1422  -1.3303  -0.1380  -0.0289  0.2262  0.1178  1.4674  -0.4765  
SD 0.1379  0.0557  2.7636  0.0709  0.2097  0.3089  0.4606  0.6932  0.2641  
t-value -0.0593  2.5499*  -0.4814  -1.9461***  -0.1378  0.7322  0.2557  2.1167**  -1.8041***  
p-value 0.9527  0.0108  0.6303  0.0517  0.8904  0.4643  0.7984  0.0369  0.0720  
α3 0.3225  -0.0669  0.3034  0.0795  0.1396  0.0696  -0.0818  -0.3271  0.0012  
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SD 0.0215  0.0141  0.7604  0.0209  0.0568  0.0588  0.1225  0.1621  0.0327  
t-value 14.9704*  -4.7586*  0.3990  3.8058*  2.4593**  1.1839  -0.6677  -2.0177**  0.0361  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.6899  0.0001  0.0142  0.2369  0.5050  0.0465  0.9712  
α4 0.0070  -0.0021  -0.0054  -0.0016  -0.0007  0.0014  0.0005  -0.0039  -0.0062  
SD 0.0003  0.0002  0.0055  0.0001  0.0003  0.0006  0.0015  0.0013  0.0183  
t-value 20.9524*  -12.2010*  -0.9729  -11.2755*  -1.9471***  2.3131**  0.3401  -2.9032*  -0.3393  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.3307  0.0000  0.0519  0.0210  0.7341  0.0046  0.7346  
R2 0.1677  0.0403  -0.0008  0.0223  0.0100  0.0097  -0.0156  0.1486  -0.0014  
Panel C: Whole sample 
α0 0.3312  0.2220  -1.5284  0.2440  0.3436  0.0853  0.5352  0.6266  -0.0978  
SD 0.0383  0.0268  0.6843  0.0225  0.0755  0.0957  0.2592  0.2191  0.1009  
t-value 8.6528*  8.2886*  -2.2337**  10.8603*  4.5509*  0.8912  2.0650**  2.8595*  -0.9691  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0256  0.0000  0.0000  0.3731  0.0401  0.0052  0.3331  
α1 -0.0001  0.0041  0.0110  0.0010  -0.0460  0.0000  0.0549  -0.0435  0.0026  
SD 0.0016  0.0122  0.0465  0.0014  0.0286  0.0117  0.1178  0.0930  0.0067  
t-value -0.0554  0.3375  0.2372  0.7222  -1.6108  0.0039  0.4657  -0.4677  0.3787  
p-value 0.9558  0.7358  0.8125  0.4702  0.1076  0.9969  0.6419  0.6410  0.7051  
α2 -0.0284  0.1394  -1.2976  -0.1371  -0.0487  0.1826  0.0322  1.3881  -0.4732  
SD 0.1348  0.0551  2.7202  0.0700  0.1948  0.2841  0.4372  0.6762  0.2629  
t-value -0.2110  2.5301**  -0.4770  -1.9603***  -0.2498  0.6429  0.0736  2.0529**  -1.8000***  
p-value 0.8329  0.0114  0.6334  0.0500  0.8028  0.5205  0.9414  0.0427  0.0726  
α3 0.3165  -0.0660  0.2999  0.0796  0.1432  0.0776  -0.0751  -0.3409  0.0012  
SD 0.0204  0.0140  0.7539  0.0207  0.0540  0.0565  0.1187  0.1593  0.0326  
t-value 15.4825*  -4.7294*  0.3979  3.8395*  2.6493*  1.3730  -0.6327  -2.1404**  0.0378  
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p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.6908  0.0001  0.0082  0.1702  0.5276  0.0348  0.9698  
α4 0.0070  -0.0021  -0.0052  -0.0016  -0.0006  0.0012  0.0007  -0.0035  -0.0060  
SD 0.0003  0.0002  0.0054  0.0001  0.0003  0.0006  0.0014  0.0013  0.0182  
t-value 21.2567*  -12.2337*  -0.9494  -11.2738*  -1.7964***  2.1256**  0.4728  -2.7271*  -0.3269  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.3425  0.0000  0.0728  0.0339  0.6368  0.0076  0.7439  
R2 0.1692  0.0399  -0.0008  0.0220  0.0097  0.0085  -0.0148  0.1388  -0.0014  
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Table 5 
Annual statistics from regression of earnings changes on dividend changes using the nonlinear model approach (t=1) 
This table reports estimates of regressions relating raw earnings changes to dividend changes. Et is the earnings before extraordinary items in year t 
(year 0 is the event year). B-1 is the book value of equity at the end of year -1. RΔDIV0 is the annual percentage change in the cash dividend payment in 
year 0. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. ROEt is equal to the earnings 
before extraordinary items in year t scaled by the book value of equity at the end of year t. DFE0 is equal to ROE0 -E [ROE0], where E [ROE0] is the 
fitted value from the cross-sectional regression of ROE0 on the logarithm of the total assets in year -1, the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of 
equity in year-1, and ROE-1. CE0 is equal to (E0-E-1)/B-1. NDFED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is negative; it is 0 otherwise. 
PDFED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is positive and 0 otherwise. NCED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 
is negative and 0 otherwise. PCED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is positive and 0 otherwise. R
2 
is the average (adjusted) R
2
 of 
the cross-sectional regressions. *, ** and *** denote significant difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: Small firms 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
α0 -0.1306  -0.0460  -0.1464  -0.1786  0.0077  -0.4021  0.0703  NA NA NA 
SD 0.0642  0.0645  0.1258  0.0630  0.0616  0.1875  0.1062  NA NA NA 
t-value -2.0360**  -0.7133  -1.1637  -2.8351*  0.1253  -2.1445**  0.6615  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.0460  0.4785  0.2494  0.0056  0.9005  0.0364  0.5109  NA NA NA 
α1 -0.0001  0.0014  0.0261  -0.0003  -0.0027  0.1137  0.0334  NA NA NA 
SD 0.0002  0.0607  0.0148  0.0137  0.0043  0.1783  0.0360  NA NA NA 
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t-value -0.4451  0.0230  1.7653***  -0.0241  -0.6210  0.6377  0.9268  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.6578  0.9817  0.0829  0.9808  0.5362  0.5263  0.3578  NA NA NA 
α2 -0.3166  0.1311  0.2798  0.0462  -0.0372  -0.0540  -0.0281  NA NA NA 
SD 0.1552  0.1368  0.4117  0.1254  0.1365  0.3727  0.1698  NA NA NA 
t-value -2.0402**  0.9577  0.6796  0.3684  -0.2721  -0.1450  -0.1655  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.0456  0.3422  0.4995  0.7135  0.7862  0.8853  0.8691  NA NA NA 
γ1 -0.0005  0.0078  -0.0139  0.0145  0.0083  0.0388  0.0314  NA NA NA 
SD 0.0034  0.0026  0.0091  0.0033  0.0031  0.0119  0.0043  NA NA NA 
t-value -0.1511  3.0486*  -1.5237  4.3840*  2.6805*  3.2546*  7.3285*  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.8804  0.0035  0.1331  0.0000  0.0087  0.0019  0.0000  NA NA NA 
γ2 -0.0088  -0.0100  -0.0035  -0.0224  -0.0127  -0.0616  -0.0458  NA NA NA 
SD 0.0132  0.0101  0.0322  0.0066  0.0058  0.0203  0.0098  NA NA NA 
t-value -0.6716  -0.9952  -0.1099  -3.4067*  -2.1784**  -3.0279*  -4.6881*  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.5043  0.3238  0.9128  0.0010  0.0320  0.0037  0.0000  NA NA NA 
γ3 -0.0002  0.0001  -0.0006  -0.0001  0.0000  -0.0002  -0.0002  NA NA NA 
SD 0.0004  0.0002  0.0008  0.0001  0.0000  0.0002  0.0001  NA NA NA 
t-value -0.5653  0.7220  -0.7235  -1.5639  -0.6812  -1.1364  -1.4606  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.5739  0.4732  0.4723  0.1213  0.4975  0.2607  0.1494  NA NA NA 
γ4 0.0000  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0003  NA NA NA 
SD 0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  NA NA NA 
t-value -1.0655  -5.2058*  -1.3678  -5.5828*  -3.4640*  -2.9397*  -8.5007*  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.2908  0.0000  0.1768  0.0000  0.0008  0.0048  0.0000  NA NA NA 
λ1 -2.0066  -0.7031  -1.3180  0.6099  -0.5483  1.0462  -1.8686  NA NA NA 
SD 0.3704  0.5373  1.4297  0.3413  0.3574  1.0833  0.2399  NA NA NA 
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Table 5 (continued)         
t-value -5.4168*  -1.3085  -0.9219  1.7869***  -1.5341  0.9657  -7.7900*  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.0000  0.1959  0.3605  0.0773  0.1285  0.3384  0.0000  NA NA NA 
λ2 5.4425  0.1692  2.3868  -1.9148  0.7553  0.2515  3.7976  NA NA NA 
SD 1.3033  0.9503  2.4185  0.6687  0.5749  2.2181  0.9272  NA NA NA 
t-value 4.1758*  0.1780  0.9869  -2.8635*  1.3137  0.1134  4.0957*  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.0001  0.8593  0.3279  0.0052  0.1923  0.9102  0.0001  NA NA NA 
λ3 5.9524  -0.8633  2.3042  -0.6906  0.0624  1.1803  1.1503  NA NA NA 
SD 2.8585  0.5885  3.0562  0.3726  0.1869  1.5019  0.9551  NA NA NA 
t-value 2.0823**  -1.4670  0.7539  -1.8534***  0.3338  0.7859  1.2043  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.0414  0.1478  0.4540  0.0671  0.7393  0.4353  0.2333  NA NA NA 
λ4 0.4004  1.3317  1.9879  -0.4337  0.2729  -1.9408  0.9604  NA NA NA 
SD 0.2079  0.5604  1.7858  0.2448  0.2562  0.9194  0.0912  NA NA NA 
t-value 1.9262***  2.3762**  1.1132  -1.7719***  1.0652  -2.1110**  10.5305*  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.0587  0.0208  0.2703  0.0798  0.2896  0.0393  0.0000  NA NA NA 
R2 0.8386  0.3716  0.5296  0.4051  0.1189  0.1192  0.9638  NA NA NA 
Panel B: Large firms 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
α0 -0.3879  0.0292  0.8637  0.0415  0.0699  0.0838  0.2064  0.2631  0.0999  0.0420  
SD 0.0433  0.0278  0.7160  0.0209  0.0257  0.0739  0.1144  0.1610  0.0864  0.0990  
t-value -8.9599*  1.0523  1.2063  1.9854**  2.7201*  1.1349  1.8049***  1.6340  1.1554  0.4243  
p-value 0.0000  0.2927  0.2278  0.0471  0.0065  0.2567  0.0715  0.1037  0.2484  0.6715  
α1 0.0071  -0.0014  -0.0050  0.0001  -0.0029  -0.0044  0.0169  -0.0011  -0.0053  0.0065  
SD 0.0030  0.0100  0.0252  0.0012  0.0034  0.0081  0.0557  0.0192  0.0066  0.0093  
t-value 2.3415**  -0.1360  -0.1999  0.1236  -0.8556  -0.5408  0.3024  -0.0593  -0.8064  0.7002  
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Table 5 (continued)         
p-value 0.0193  0.8918  0.8415  0.9017  0.3922  0.5888  0.7625  0.9528  0.4204  0.4841  
α2 -0.6809  0.0400  2.9441  -0.0703  -0.1621  -0.5083  -0.0507  -0.4925  -0.0561  -0.2240  
SD 0.1570  0.0615  2.5335  0.0580  0.0611  0.2140  0.2151  0.4686  0.2591  0.1532  
t-value -4.3363*  0.6503  1.1621  -1.2125  -2.6533*  -2.3750**  -0.2358  -1.0509  -0.2166  -1.4617  
p-value 0.0000  0.5156  0.2453  0.2254  0.0080  0.0178  0.8136  0.2945  0.8286  0.1443  
γ1 0.0000  0.0016  0.0068  0.0004  0.0012  -0.0006  0.0012  0.0046  0.0002  -0.0958  
SD 0.0007  0.0007  0.0202  0.0004  0.0006  0.0011  0.0021  0.0063  0.0036  0.0883  
t-value -0.0472  2.1306**  0.3386  0.8964  2.1259**  -0.5389  0.5450  0.7381  0.0549  -1.0845  
p-value 0.9624  0.0332  0.7349  0.3701  0.0335  0.5901  0.5859  0.4613  0.9563  0.2786  
γ2 -0.0031  -0.0051  -0.0758  -0.0013  -0.0039  -0.0016  0.0102  0.0008  -0.0037  0.1834  
SD 0.0023  0.0013  0.0445  0.0009  0.0010  0.0032  0.0041  0.0108  0.0070  0.1676  
t-value -1.3322  -3.9053*  -1.7019***  -1.4614  -3.9360*  -0.5205  2.5112**  0.0710  -0.5311  1.0942  
p-value 0.1829  0.0001  0.0888  0.1440  0.0001  0.6028  0.0122  0.9435  0.5956  0.2743  
γ3 0.0000  0.0000  -0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0158  
SD 0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0228  
t-value -1.6028  -4.9186* -1.3378  0.0375  -1.9270***  -0.8971  13.1041*  1.6962***  -0.0638  0.6950  
p-value 0.1090  0.0000  0.1810  0.9701  0.0540  0.3699  0.0000  0.0913  0.9492  0.4873  
γ4 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0155  
SD 0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0170  
t-value 0.3434  -1.6446  -0.5861  -2.9151*  -3.2842*  0.3928  0.1110  -0.2366  0.8399  0.9110  
p-value 0.7313  0.1001  0.5579  0.0036  0.0010  0.6946  0.9116  0.8132  0.4013  0.3627  
λ1 -1.2625  -0.3076  -0.0749  -0.3817  -0.1685  0.2781  0.2239  -0.2862  -0.4243  -0.1147  
SD 0.0428  0.0287  1.3991  0.0381  0.0353  0.0886  0.0976  0.2535  0.1315  0.0752  
t-value -29.5230*  -10.7207*  -0.0535  -10.0167*  -4.7688*  3.1386*  2.2953*  -1.1292  -3.2270*  -1.5248  
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Table 5 (continued)         
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.9573  0.0000  0.0000  0.0018  0.0220  0.2601  0.0013  0.1278  
λ2 1.9699  -0.0562  0.9647  0.0926  -0.0367  -0.1080  -0.9258  -1.6546  0.1385  -0.0536  
SD 0.2022  0.0927  3.1844  0.0947  0.0811  0.3094  0.2984  0.9992  0.4834  0.2267  
t-value 9.7424*  -0.6066  0.3029  0.9783  -0.4530  -0.3492  -3.1019*  -1.6559***  0.2865  -0.2365  
p-value 0.0000  0.5442  0.7619  0.3279  0.6506  0.7270  0.0020  0.0992  0.7746  0.8131  
λ3 0.1379  -0.0845  0.1555  -0.0200  0.0444  0.4312  -0.1808  -0.8378  -0.1687  0.0532  
SD 0.0687  0.0269  0.6238  0.0316  0.0195  0.1383  0.0938  0.6745  0.2956  0.0835  
t-value 2.0071**  -3.1407*  0.2492  -0.6328  2.2737**  3.1168*  -1.9262***  -1.2421  -0.5706  0.6374  
p-value 0.0448  0.0017  0.8032  0.5269  0.0230  0.0019  0.0544  0.2155  0.5685  0.5241  
λ4 0.0032  -0.0134  0.1599  0.0260  -0.0232  -0.0737  -0.0846  0.0362  0.0195  -0.0531  
SD 0.0007  0.0007  0.1832  0.0062  0.0031  0.0086  0.0082  0.0439  0.0176  0.0101  
t-value 4.6510*  -18.6927*  0.8728  4.1949*  -7.4065*  -8.5554*  -10.3282*  0.8238  1.1084  -5.2763*  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.3828  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.4109  0.2682  0.0000  
R2 0.4157  0.3882  -0.0005  0.0777  0.1008  0.1781  0.3825  0.0560  0.0750  0.2067  
Panel C: Whole sample 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
α0 -0.3818  0.0287  0.8275  0.0409  0.0689  0.0713  0.1038  0.2457  0.0960  0.0420  
SD 0.0424  0.0273  0.7014  0.0205  0.0253  0.0688  0.1039  0.1515  0.0854  0.0989  
t-value -8.9996*  1.0507  1.1799  1.9950**  2.7199*  1.0368  0.9991  1.6220  1.1240  0.4246  
p-value 0.0000  0.2934  0.2381  0.0461  0.0065  0.3001  0.3180  0.1062  0.2615  0.6713  
α1 0.0017  -0.0013  -0.0048  0.0001  -0.0028  -0.0043  0.2567  -0.0007  -0.0055  0.0065  
SD 0.0014  0.0099  0.0250  0.0012  0.0033  0.0079  0.0289  0.0188  0.0066  0.0093  
t-value 1.1639  -0.1309  -0.1932  0.1299  -0.8580  -0.5452  8.8710*  -0.0360  -0.8321  0.7003  
p-value 0.2445  0.8959  0.8468  0.8966  0.3909  0.5857  0.0000  0.9713  0.4057  0.4840  
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α2 -0.6642  0.0408  2.9483  -0.0680  -0.1592  -0.4106  -0.2590  -0.5008  -0.0513  -0.2236  
SD 0.1537  0.0607  2.4879  0.0570  0.0603  0.1963  0.1990  0.4566  0.2569  0.1530  
t-value -4.3211*  0.6723  1.1850  -1.1923  -2.6380* -2.0912**  -1.3017  -1.0967  -0.1996  -1.4617  
p-value 0.0000  0.5014  0.2361  0.2332  0.0084  0.0368  0.1934  0.2739  0.8419  0.1443  
γ1 0.0000  0.0016  0.0065  0.0004  0.0012  -0.0004  -0.0010  0.0050  0.0006  -0.0942  
SD 0.0007  0.0007  0.0199  0.0004  0.0006  0.0011  0.0020  0.0061  0.0036  0.0880  
t-value 0.0088  2.1820**  0.3275  0.8979  2.1470**  -0.3648  -0.4704  0.8170  0.1562  -1.0701  
p-value 0.9930  0.0292  0.7433  0.3693  0.0318  0.7153  0.6382  0.4148  0.8760  0.2850  
γ2 -0.0032  -0.0051  -0.0763  -0.0013  -0.0040  -0.0022  0.0130  0.0002  -0.0042  0.1814  
SD 0.0023  0.0013  0.0439  0.0009  0.0010  0.0030  0.0039  0.0105  0.0069  0.1672  
t-value -1.3779  -3.9709*  -1.7373***  -1.4750  -4.0114*  -0.7202  3.3620*  0.0237  -0.6085  1.0851  
p-value 0.1683  0.0001  0.0824  0.1402  0.0001  0.4715  0.0008  0.9812  0.5431  0.2783  
γ3 0.0000  0.0000  -0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0158  
SD 0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0227  
t-value -1.6382  -4.9609*  -1.3710  0.0429  -1.9635**  -0.9535  13.6463*  1.7172***  -0.0854  0.6935  
p-value 0.1015  0.0000  0.1704  0.9658  0.0496  0.3406  0.0000  0.0873  0.9320  0.4883  
γ4 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0152  
SD 0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0170  
t-value 0.3097  -1.7154***  -0.5801  -2.9440*  -3.3188*  0.2513  1.5261  -0.3128  0.7472  0.8961  
p-value 0.7568  0.0863  0.5619  0.0033  0.0009  0.8016  0.1273  0.7547  0.4553  0.3705  
λ1 -1.2559  -0.3065  -0.0383  -0.3809  -0.1681  0.2771  0.1678  -0.2616  -0.4218  -0.1155  
SD 0.0423  0.0284  1.3838  0.0377  0.0351  0.0859  0.0946  0.2449  0.1309  0.0750  
t-value -29.7091*  -10.7761*  -0.0277  -10.0939*  -4.7961*  3.2257*  1.7735***  -1.0680  -3.2224*  -1.5392  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.9779  0.0000  0.0000  0.0013  0.0765  0.2866  0.0013  0.1242  
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Table 5 (continued)         
λ2 1.9642  -0.0569  0.9324  0.0910  -0.0342  -0.1143  -0.9009  -1.7106  0.1432  -0.0515  
SD 0.2003  0.0920  3.1500  0.0938  0.0805  0.2982  0.2887  0.9734  0.4809  0.2262  
t-value 9.8061*  -0.6192  0.2960  0.9704  -0.4244  -0.3834  -3.1210*  -1.7573***  0.2977  -0.2278  
p-value 0.0000  0.5358  0.7672  0.3319  0.6713  0.7015  0.0019  0.0802  0.7661  0.8198  
λ3 0.1394  -0.0848  0.1550  -0.0204  0.0442  0.4299  -0.1887  -0.8574  -0.1645  0.0536  
SD 0.0681  0.0267  0.6185  0.0313  0.0194  0.1344  0.0916  0.6585  0.2943  0.0833  
t-value 2.0457**  -3.1771*  0.2507  -0.6511  2.2804**  3.1989*  -2.0599**  -1.3021  -0.5589  0.6432  
p-value 0.0408  0.0015  0.8021  0.5150  0.0226  0.0014  0.0397  0.1942  0.5765  0.5204  
λ4 0.0031  -0.0135  0.1565  0.0259  -0.0232  -0.0739  -0.0787  0.0335  0.0193  -0.0530  
SD 0.0007  0.0007  0.1814  0.0061  0.0031  0.0084  0.0080  0.0427  0.0175  0.0100  
t-value 4.6237*  -18.8758*  0.8627  4.2163*  -7.4586*  -8.8223*  -9.8733*  0.7857  1.1037  -5.2794*  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.3884  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.4329  0.2702  0.0000  
R2 0.4157  0.3879  -0.0004  0.0778  0.1007  0.1736  0.3942  0.0584  0.0735  0.2067  
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Table 6 
Annual statistics from regression of earnings changes on dividend changes using the nonlinear model approach (t=2) 
This table reports estimates of regressions relating raw earnings changes to dividend changes. Et is the earnings before extraordinary items in year t 
(year 0 is the event year). B-1 is the book value of equity at the end of year -1. RΔDIV0 is the annual percentage change in the cash dividend payment in 
year 0. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. ROEt is equal to the earnings 
before extraordinary items in year t scaled by the book value of equity at the end of year t. DFE0 is equal to ROE0 -E [ROE0], where E [ROE0] is the 
fitted value from the cross-sectional regression of ROE0 on the logarithm of the total assets in year -1, the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of 
equity in year-1, and ROE-1. CE0 is equal to (E0-E-1)/B-1. NDFED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is negative; it is 0 otherwise. 
PDFED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is positive and 0 otherwise. NCED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 
is negative and 0 otherwise. PCED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is positive and 0 otherwise. R
2 
is the average (adjusted) R
2
 of 
the cross-sectional regressions. *, ** and *** denote significant difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: Small firms 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
α0 0.0124  0.0599  0.1839  0.0277  0.0505  0.1962  NA NA NA 
SD 0.1623  0.1607  0.1726  0.0570  0.0806  0.2174  NA NA NA 
t-value 0.0762  0.3730  1.0654  0.4851  0.6265  0.9025  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.9396  0.7112  0.2929  0.6291  0.5342  0.3721  NA NA NA 
α1 0.0005  -0.0586  -0.0302  0.0089  -0.0092  -0.1850  NA NA NA 
SD 0.0005  0.1423  0.0344  0.0145  0.0291  0.1945  NA NA NA 
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t-value 1.0380  -0.4120  -0.8785  0.6144  -0.3155  -0.9509  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.3049  0.6826  0.3848  0.5409  0.7538  0.3472  NA NA NA 
α2 0.4046  0.0134  -0.3179  -0.1413  0.0002  0.2979  NA NA NA 
SD 0.4071  0.4238  0.5237  0.1297  0.1913  0.4646  NA NA NA 
t-value 0.9938  0.0316  -0.6070  -1.0892  0.0010  0.6413  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.3258  0.9749  0.5472  0.2799  0.9992  0.5249  NA NA NA 
γ1 0.0060  0.0103  0.0658  0.0019  0.0012  -0.0327  NA NA NA 
SD 0.0140  0.0060  0.0106  0.0031  0.0034  0.0130  NA NA NA 
t-value 0.4309  1.7080***  6.2093*  0.6250  0.3654  -2.5099**  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.6686  0.0956  0.0000  0.5340  0.7165  0.0161  NA NA NA 
γ2 -0.0246  -0.0180  -0.0596  -0.0010  0.0031  0.0496  NA NA NA 
SD 0.0333  0.0463  0.0379  0.0066  0.0129  0.0234  NA NA NA 
t-value -0.7395  -0.3883  -1.5720  -0.1466  0.2410  2.1193**  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.4635  0.6999  0.1236  0.8839  0.8106  0.0402  NA NA NA 
γ3 -0.0009  0.0000  0.0008  0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  NA NA NA 
SD 0.0009  0.0020  0.0009  0.0001  0.0003  0.0002  NA NA NA 
t-value -0.9976  0.0220  0.8197  -0.0187  0.3524  1.4745  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.3239  0.9826  0.4171  0.9851  0.7262  0.1480  NA NA NA 
γ4 -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0010  0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  NA NA NA 
SD 0.0001  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  NA NA NA 
t-value -0.8648  -3.4413*  -7.3393*  0.0289  -1.1673  1.9788**  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.3918  0.0014  0.0000  0.9770  0.2492  0.0546  NA NA NA 
λ1 1.5084  -1.7794  -5.4994  -0.2208  -0.1761  1.3906  NA NA NA 
SD 1.7269  1.2941  1.8343  0.3259  0.3556  1.1826  NA NA NA 
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Table 6 (continued)        
t-value 0.8735  -1.3750  -2.9982*  -0.6775  -0.4951  1.1759  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.3871  0.1770  0.0046  0.5004  0.6230  0.2464  NA NA NA 
λ2 -7.7274  4.4907  8.0410  1.3645  -0.2233  -3.7886  NA NA NA 
SD 3.9755  3.0494  4.1732  1.1386  0.8206  2.5860  NA NA NA 
t-value -1.9438***  1.4727  1.9268***  1.1984  -0.2721  -1.4650  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.0583  0.1489  0.0610  0.2349  0.7868  0.1505  NA NA NA 
λ3 -12.4205  0.7592  6.6548  3.8982  -0.5166  -3.3319  NA NA NA 
SD 7.2993  8.2119  9.3893  2.4133  0.3649  1.7936  NA NA NA 
t-value -1.7016***  0.0925  0.7088  1.6153  -1.4159  -1.8577***  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.0959  0.9268  0.4825  0.1108  0.1637  0.0704  NA NA NA 
λ4 1.4680  3.3899  13.7715  0.0669  0.3099  -0.4788  NA NA NA 
SD 1.7707  1.3143  2.4089  0.2247  0.2374  0.9821  NA NA NA 
t-value 0.8290  2.5791**  5.7170*  0.2979  1.3054  -0.4875  NA NA NA 
p-value 0.4116  0.0138  0.0000  0.7667  0.1984  0.6285  NA NA NA 
R2 0.6692  0.2452  0.6962  -0.0241  0.3270  0.0161  NA NA NA 
Panel B: Large firms 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
α0 0.3611  0.0177  -0.7936  0.0648  0.2172  0.0353  0.2727  -0.6630  0.0357  
SD 0.0502  0.0319  0.8992  0.0278  0.0977  0.1196  0.3130  0.3353  0.0906  
t-value 7.1952*  0.5541  -0.8826  2.3305**  2.2234**  0.2949  0.8714  -1.9775**  0.3937  
p-value 0.0000  0.5795  0.3775  0.0198  0.0265  0.7682  0.3845  0.0511  0.6940  
α1 -0.0301  0.0057  0.0075  0.0017  -0.0400  -0.0003  0.0097  0.0989  0.0037  
SD 0.0090  0.0135  0.0472  0.0015  0.0303  0.0116  0.1192  0.0885  0.0062  
t-value -3.3472*  0.4201  0.1580  1.1873  -1.3185  -0.0269  0.0816  1.1175  0.5979  
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Table 6 (continued)        
p-value 0.0008  0.6744  0.8745  0.2352  0.1878  0.9785  0.9350  0.2669  0.5502  
α2 0.9260  0.1637  -4.1087  -0.0878  0.2544  0.4975  0.4939  0.9967  -0.6583  
SD 0.1856  0.0713  3.2856  0.0802  0.2472  0.3623  0.5059  0.7245  0.3037  
t-value 4.9892*  2.2969**  -1.2505  -1.0954  1.0295  1.3732  0.9762  1.3758  -2.1678**  
p-value 0.0000  0.0217  0.2112  0.2734  0.3036  0.1702  0.3301  0.1724  0.0308  
γ1 0.0026  0.0026  -0.0098  -0.0005  0.0008  -0.0025  -0.0015  0.0237  0.0054  
SD 0.0008  0.0008  0.0246  0.0006  0.0026  0.0017  0.0048  0.0143  0.0038  
t-value 3.2088*  3.1044*  -0.3989  -0.8629  0.3039  -1.4661  -0.3042  1.6548***  1.4024  
p-value 0.0013  0.0019  0.6900  0.3882  0.7613  0.1431  0.7613  0.1016  0.1616  
γ2 -0.0073  -0.0086  0.0927  0.0002  -0.0025  -0.0051  0.0115  -0.0703  0.0035  
SD 0.0030  0.0015  0.0591  0.0012  0.0052  0.0055  0.0144  0.0264  0.0075  
t-value -2.4321**  -5.7117*  1.5685  0.1839  -0.4740  -0.9269  0.7986  -2.6662*  0.4637  
p-value 0.0151  0.0000  0.1168  0.8541  0.6356  0.3543  0.4254  0.0091  0.6431  
γ3 0.0000  0.0000  0.0003  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0001  0.0002  -0.0004  0.0001  
SD 0.0000  0.0000  0.0003  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0002  0.0000  
t-value 0.2017  -8.3688*  1.1172  0.2629  -0.5644  -2.4624**  1.4901  -1.7925***  3.2252*  
p-value 0.8401  0.0000  0.2640  0.7926  0.5727  0.0141  0.1377  0.0765  0.0014  
γ4 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0002  0.0000  
SD 0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  
t-value -1.8339***  -3.9781*  0.4297  1.9448***  -0.7860  4.7956*  0.1212  -2.1912**  -2.4681**  
p-value 0.0668  0.0001  0.6674  0.0518  0.4322  0.0000  0.9037  0.0311  0.0140  
λ1 1.2373  -0.0837  -0.4136  0.1957  0.1390  0.3961  1.0460  0.8807  -0.2688  
SD 0.0530  0.0342  1.9654  0.0529  0.1756  0.1377  0.3984  0.5384  0.1421  
t-value 23.3528*  -2.4489**  -0.2105  3.7005*  0.7914  2.8773*  2.6257*  1.6357  -1.8915***  
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Table 6 (continued)        
p-value 0.0000  0.0144  0.8333  0.0002  0.4290  0.0041  0.0093  0.1055  0.0593  
λ2 -2.0944  0.2878  -0.1848  -0.2800  -0.6327  -0.9979  -3.7004  1.4394  0.4028  
SD 0.2464  0.1111  5.1730  0.1286  0.3763  0.4909  1.3195  1.7450  0.5338  
t-value -8.5012*  2.5917*  -0.0357  -2.1767**  -1.6813***  -2.0327**  -2.8045*  0.8249  0.7545  
p-value 0.0000  0.0096  0.9715  0.0295  0.0932  0.0425  0.0055  0.4117  0.4510  
λ3 -0.1885  0.0329  0.1291  -0.0361  -0.2031  0.0357  -1.3685  1.8873  -0.6733  
SD 0.1075  0.0332  2.3062  0.0418  0.1117  0.2342  0.7815  1.2093  0.3234  
t-value -1.7535***  0.9884  0.0560  -0.8624  -1.8191***  0.1523  -1.7512***  1.5606  -2.0816**  
p-value 0.0796  0.3230  0.9554  0.3885  0.0693  0.8790  0.0814  0.1222  0.0380  
λ4 -0.0150  -0.0004  0.0710  -0.0313  0.0471  -0.0305  -0.2296  -0.1215  0.0298  
SD 0.0008  0.0008  0.3096  0.0091  0.0437  0.0126  0.0818  0.0955  0.0204  
t-value -18.8019*  -0.5326  0.2292  -3.4401*  1.0774  -2.4135**  -2.8082*  -1.2724  1.4571  
p-value 0.0000  0.5943  0.8187  0.0006  0.2817  0.0161  0.0055  0.2066  0.1459  
R2 0.1923  0.0297  -0.0015  0.0031  0.0127  0.0778  0.0346  0.3187  0.1446  
Panel C: Whole sample 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
α0 0.3327  0.0175  -0.7571  0.0633  0.1963  0.0217  0.2327  -0.5731  0.0368  
SD 0.0488  0.0315  0.8814  0.0273  0.0893  0.1098  0.2868  0.3151  0.0896  
t-value 6.8213*  0.5551  -0.8590  2.3166**  2.1993**  0.1981  0.8114  -1.8185***  0.4113  
p-value 0.0000  0.5788  0.3904  0.0206  0.0282  0.8430  0.4180  0.0722  0.6811  
α1 -0.0007  0.0055  0.0069  0.0017  -0.0382  0.0001  0.0114  0.0912  0.0037  
SD 0.0016  0.0134  0.0469  0.0014  0.0286  0.0112  0.1163  0.0860  0.0062  
t-value -0.4427  0.4129  0.1476  1.1992  -1.3344  0.0049  0.0983  1.0598  0.5991  
p-value 0.6580  0.6797  0.8826  0.2305  0.1825  0.9961  0.9218  0.2920  0.5495  
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Table 6 (continued)        
α2 0.8595  0.1627  -4.0948  -0.0862  0.2399  0.4419  0.4693  0.9391  -0.6579  
SD 0.1816  0.0707  3.2271  0.0790  0.2275  0.3267  0.4868  0.7085  0.3025  
t-value 4.7336 * 2.3013**  -1.2689  -1.0919  1.0548  1.3525  0.9640  1.3254  -2.1752 ** 
p-value 0.0000  0.0214  0.2046  0.2749  0.2919  0.1766  0.3361  0.1883  0.0302  
γ1 0.0024  0.0026  -0.0096  -0.0005  0.0007  -0.0026  -0.0013  0.0269  0.0054  
SD 0.0008  0.0008  0.0244  0.0006  0.0025  0.0017  0.0046  0.0137  0.0038  
t-value 2.9191*  3.1509*  -0.3960  -0.8412  0.2671  -1.5803  -0.2742  1.9569***  1.4061  
p-value 0.0035  0.0016  0.6921  0.4003  0.7895  0.1145  0.7842  0.0534  0.1605  
γ2 -0.0070  -0.0086  0.0932  0.0002  -0.0024  -0.0050  0.0098  -0.0699  0.0035  
SD 0.0030  0.0015  0.0583  0.0012  0.0049  0.0052  0.0138  0.0257  0.0075  
t-value -2.3628**  -5.7612*  1.5979  0.1839  -0.4943  -0.9771  0.7095  -2.7227*  0.4708  
p-value 0.0182  0.0000  0.1101  0.8541  0.6213  0.3289  0.4788  0.0077  0.6380  
γ3 0.0000  0.0000  0.0003  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0001  0.0001  -0.0004  0.0001  
SD 0.0000  0.0000  0.0003  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0002  0.0000  
t-value 0.1906  -8.4069*  1.1398  0.2629  -0.5529  -2.5912*  1.4412  -1.7026  3.2411*  
p-value 0.8488  0.0000  0.2545  0.7926  0.5805  0.0098  0.1510  0.0920  0.0013  
γ4 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0003  0.0000  
SD 0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  
t-value -1.6526***  -4.0625*  0.4265  1.9448***  -0.7900  5.0296*  0.0984  -2.4968**  -2.4764**  
p-value 0.0985  0.0000  0.6698  0.0518  0.4298  0.0000  0.9217  0.0143  0.0137  
λ1 1.2127  -0.0815  -0.4373  0.1955  0.1520  0.4030  1.0582  0.6969  -0.2695  
SD 0.0520  0.0339  1.9449  0.0524  0.1654  0.1320  0.3841  0.5136  0.1414  
t-value 23.3042*  -2.4019**  -0.2248  3.7333*  0.9186  3.0528*  2.7549*  1.3570  -1.9051***  
p-value 0.0000  0.0164  0.8221  0.0002  0.3586  0.0024  0.0064  0.1781  0.0575  
Dividend Changes and Firm Performance                                               01.09.2011                                                                                                                                      
 61 
Table 6 (continued)        
λ2 -2.0759  0.2870  -0.1539  -0.2818  -0.6532  -0.9533  -3.6368  1.5765  0.4028  
SD 0.2445  0.1104  5.1245  0.1275  0.3568  0.4678  1.2612  1.7011  0.5317  
t-value -8.4908*  2.6000*  -0.0300  -2.2110**  -1.8309***  -2.0379**  -2.8837*  0.9268  0.7575  
p-value 0.0000  0.0094  0.9760  0.0271  0.0675  0.0419  0.0043  0.3565  0.4492  
λ3 -0.1907  0.0329  0.1297  -0.0367  -0.2154  0.0516  -1.3222  1.8251  -0.6735  
SD 0.1068  0.0331  2.2869  0.0415  0.1071  0.2250  0.7549  1.1836  0.3222  
t-value -1.7858***  0.9955  0.0567  -0.8836  -2.0118**  0.2293  -1.7514***  1.5419  -2.0903**  
p-value 0.0742  0.3195  0.9548  0.3770  0.0446  0.8187  0.0813  0.1265  0.0372  
λ4 -0.0149  -0.0005  0.0735  -0.0313  0.0456  -0.0308  -0.2316  -0.0904  0.0298  
SD 0.0008  0.0008  0.3068  0.0090  0.0416  0.0122  0.0791  0.0913  0.0203  
t-value -18.8203*  -0.5892  0.2395  -3.4686*  1.0955  -2.5379**  -2.9279*  -0.9909  1.4662  
p-value 0.0000  0.5558  0.8107  0.0005  0.2736  0.0114  0.0038  0.3244  0.1434  
R2 0.1914  0.0297  -0.0014  0.0031  0.0150  0.0785  0.0371  0.3099  0.1444  
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Table 7 
Summary statistics from nonlinear regression of the future earnings change, deflated by the book value, on the dividend change and certain control 
variables 
This table reports estimates of regressions relating raw earnings changes to dividend changes. Et is the earnings before extraordinary items in year t 
(year 0 is the event year). B-1 is the book value of equity at the end of year -1. RΔDIV0 is the annual percentage change in the cash dividend payment in 
year 0. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. ROEt is equal to the earnings 
before extraordinary items in year t scaled by the book value of equity at the end of year t. DFE0 is equal to ROE0 -E [ROE0], where E [ROE0] is the 
fitted value from the cross-sectional regression of ROE0 on the logarithm of the total assets in year -1, the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of 
equity in year-1, and ROE-1. CE0 is equal to (E0-E-1)/B-1. NDFED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is negative; it is 0 otherwise. 
PDFED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is positive and 0 otherwise. NCED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 
is negative and 0 otherwise. PCED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is positive and 0 otherwise. R
2 
is the average (adjusted) R
2
 of 
the cross-sectional regressions. *, ** and *** denote significant difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: Small firms 
t α0 α1 α2 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 R
2 N 
1 -0.1180  0.0245  0.0030  0.0124  -0.0235  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.6841  1.5554  1.2994  0.3684  
0.4781  569 
t-value -2.0305** 1.5469  0.0436  1.8099*** -2.8558* -1.9134*** -3.8454* -1.5443  1.6542*** 1.4689  0.7593  
2 0.0884  -0.0456  0.0428  0.0088  -0.0084  0.0000  -0.0002  -0.7961  0.3595  -0.8261  3.0879  
0.3216  365 
t-value 2.6883* -1.5411  0.3894  0.6728  -0.5691  0.1950  -1.0266  -0.7490  0.1556  -0.3040  1.3977  
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Table 7 (continued)            
Panel B: Large firms 
1 0.1312  0.0011  0.0739  -0.0080  0.0100  0.0016  0.0015  -0.2518  0.0331  -0.0469  -0.0003  
0.1880  31619 
t-value 1.3399  0.4704  0.2256  -0.8223  0.4819  0.9902  0.9967  -1.8675*** 0.1080  -0.4493  -0.0148  
2 -0.0502  0.0063  -0.1692  0.0023  0.0016  0.0000  0.0000  0.3476  -0.6400  -0.0427  -0.0312  
0.0902  18817 
t-value -0.3730  0.4862  -0.3251  0.7620  0.1143  0.1651  -1.0584  1.7698*** -1.2723  -0.1484  -1.0065  
Panel C: Whole sample 
1 0.1143  0.0246  0.0653  -0.0080  0.0098  0.0016  0.0015  -0.2504  0.0262  -0.0494  -0.0004  
0.1888  32188 
t-value 1.2168  0.9514  0.1991  -0.8355  0.4786  0.9899  0.9969  -1.8875*** 0.0853  -0.4651  -0.0175  
2 -0.0477  0.0091  -0.1918  0.0027  0.0015  0.0000  0.0000  0.3256  -0.6098  -0.0443  -0.0279  
0.0897  19182 
t-value -0.3874  0.8003  -0.3735  0.7941  0.1106  0.2081  -1.0578  1.7079*** -1.2077  -0.1587  -0.9245  
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Table 8 
Nonlinear regressions of the future earnings change, deflated by the book value, on the dividend change for two periods 1998-2003 and 2006-2009 
This table reports estimates of regressions relating raw earnings changes to dividend changes. Et is the earnings before extraordinary items in year t (year 0 is the 
event year). B-1 is the book value of equity at the end of year -1. RΔDIV0 is the annual percentage change in the cash dividend payment in year 0. DPC (DNC) is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. ROEt is equal to the earnings before extraordinary items in year t scaled 
by the book value of equity at the end of year t. DFE0 is equal to ROE0 -E [ROE0], where E [ROE0] is the fitted value from the cross-sectional regression of ROE0 on 
the logarithm of the total assets in year -1, the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of equity in year-1, and ROE-1. CE0 is equal to (E0-E-1)/B-1. NDFED0 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is negative; it is 0 otherwise. PDFED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is positive and 0 
otherwise. NCED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is negative and 0 otherwise. PCED0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is 
positive and 0 otherwise. R
2 
is the average (adjusted) R
2
 of the cross-sectional regressions. *, ** and *** denote significant difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: Small firms 
t α0 α1 α2 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 R
2 N  
99-03 -0.0988  0.0049  0.0207  0.0033  -0.0115  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.7932  1.3678  1.3530  0.7118  
0.4528   413 
 
t-value -2.8648  0.9121  0.2082  0.6642  -3.7107  -1.2773  -3.4649  -1.8235  1.1126  1.0563  1.6744   
06-08 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NA NA 
 
t-value NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA  
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Table 8 (continued)             
99-03 0.0669  -0.0177  -0.0082  0.0171  -0.0200  0.0000  -0.0002  -1.2334  1.1891  -0.3250  3.8012  
0.3827  293 
 
t-value 2.1974  -1.4604  -0.0688  1.3876  -1.7934  -0.0006  -1.3084  -1.0395  0.4504  -0.0993  1.4844   
06-07 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NA NA 
 
t-value NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA  
Panel B: Large firms 
99-03 0.1233  -0.0004  0.4142  0.0020  -0.0178  -0.0001  0.0000  -0.4390  0.5868  0.0467  0.0305  
0.1964  28432 
 
t-value 0.6060  -0.1960  0.6427  1.6136  -1.2317  -1.1182  -1.4208  -2.0644** 1.4900  1.0208  0.9129   
06-08 0.1350  0.0000  -0.2575  -0.0303  0.0601  0.0053  0.0052  -0.2751  -0.5232  -0.3177  0.0009  
0.1126  1425 
 
t-value 2.0395* 0.0056  -2.0265** -0.9258  0.9759  1.0036  1.0006  -3.0720* -0.9205  -1.1865  0.0316   
99-03 -0.0266  -0.0110  -0.5705  -0.0009  0.0149  0.0001  0.0000  0.2149  -0.5808  -0.0532  0.0143  
0.0473  17432 
 
t-value -0.1321  -1.1082  -0.6337  -0.3690  0.7648  0.9291  0.3977  0.7757  -1.4308  -0.8317  0.7402   
06-07 -0.3137  0.0513  0.1692  0.0145  -0.0334  -0.0001  -0.0001  0.3059  0.9211  0.6070  -0.0459  
0.2317  504 
 
t-value -0.8979  1.0780  0.2045  1.5885  -0.9054  -0.5602  -1.4813  0.5323  1.7771*** 0.4741  -0.6064   
Panel C: Whole sample 
99-03 0.1169  -0.0014  0.4196  0.0020  -0.0180  -0.0001  0.0000  -0.4300  0.5793  0.0467  0.0298  
0.1963  28845 
 
t-value 0.5958  -1.2576  0.6519  1.6564*** -1.2321  -1.1175  -1.4366  -2.0028** 1.4805  1.0172  0.9094   
06-08 0.1279  0.0001  -0.2585  -0.0295  0.0591  0.0053  0.0051  -0.2663  -0.5397  -0.3228  0.0000  
0.1129  1444 
 
t-value 2.0992** 0.0341  -1.9747* -0.9138  0.9673  1.0034  1.0002  -3.0101* -0.9175  -1.1753  -0.0016   
99-03 -0.0295  -0.0049  -0.5838  -0.0009  0.0151  0.0001  0.0000  0.2083  -0.5756  -0.0560  0.0145  
0.0476  17725 
 
t-value -0.1551  -0.5868  -0.6549  -0.3979  0.7705  0.9318  0.4006  0.7573  -1.4244  -0.8526  0.7417   
06-07 -0.2681  0.0474  0.1406  0.0161  -0.0332  -0.0001  -0.0002  0.2137  0.9897  0.5758  -0.0303  
0.2271  512 
 
t-value -0.8792  1.0846  0.1761  1.4993  -0.9040  -0.5345  -1.4278  0.4423  1.6864*** 0.4609  -0.5041   
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Dividend Changes and firm performance 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Research Questions 
According to the information content of dividends (ICD) hypothesis (Miller and 
Modigliani, 1961), dividend changes trigger stock returns since they convey new 
information about the firm‟s future profitability and cash flow. Dividend changes 
are positively correlated with future changes in firm profitability and earnings. 
Many researchers have done empirical analysis on this issue,   
 
In this paper, we will focus on evaluating ICD hypothesis in Norwegian market to 
show the relationship between dividend changes and the firm‟s earnings and 
profitability in subsequent years in Norwegian firms.  
 
Additionally, there is an important tax reform in Norway which increased 
dividend taxation during 2004-2006. This reform results in dividend payments 
changed significantly. We will also look into this interesting thing that the 
dividend changes following the tax reform. 
 
1.2 Motivation and Practical Implications 
The information content of dividends (ICD) hypothesis is one of most important 
issues in corporate finance. Although the ICD hypothesis appears to have resurged, 
we believe it still interesting to assess the hypothesis in other markets such as 
using Norwegian market data. It is worthwhile to conduct a test of the ICD 
hypothesis using Norwegian market data because of the following reasons. First, 
past studies on the ICD hypothesis have been conducted principally in the US 
background. Therefore, it should prove that it‟s worthwhile to assess this 
hypothesis in other markets to determine whether the model is universally 
applicable. Furthermore, Companies operate under different regulatory and 
different economic and tax policies environments in Norway and the United States. 
Norwegian managers, in general, may have greater flexibility in setting their 
dividend payout than do managers of U.S. firms (H. Kent Baker, Tarun K. 
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Mukherjee and Ohannes George Paskelian, 2006), studying on Norwegian market 
data to observe the meaning of dividend payment changes is interesting.  
 
2. Literature review 
Dividend payment modeling work begins with Lintner‟s (1956) ground-breaking 
study, which argued that the main determinants of changes in dividend are current 
earnings and preceding dividend level. Since Lintner (1956) reported that firms 
increase their dividends only when managers are confident that increased earnings 
would be sustained, many researchers and market practitioners agree with the 
point that dividend changes bear informational content about the firm‟s earnings.  
 
On the basis of this, Miller and Modigliani (1961) develop a theory called „the 
information content of dividends (ICD) hypotheses‟, which is also the core 
problem we desire to investigate and check. ICD hypothesis has empirically been 
widely studied. According to ICD, dividend changes trigger stock returns since 
they convey new information about the firm‟s future profitability and cash flow. 
Similarly, dividend signaling theories by Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams 
(1985), and Miller and Rock (1985) suggest us that changes in dividend policy 
convey news about future cash flows. Specifically, dividend increases convey 
good news, and dividend decreases convey bad news. The models also predict a 
positive relationship between dividend changes and the price reaction to dividend 
changes. Dividends are seen to be an increasing function of expected cash flow 
(Brooks et al., 1998, Koch and Shenoy, 1999), they signal of the stability of the 
firm‟s future cash flow (Kale and Noe, 1990) or dividend payout ratios (of 
German firms) are based cash flows rather than published earnings (Goergen et al., 
2004). Additionally, Pettit (1972), Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and 
Mullins (1983), Dielman and Oppenheimer (1984) study on assessing the 
announcements of dividend change and related responses in the stock market also 
show that dividend change is positively associated with abnormal returns in the 
stock price of the underlying firm. It indicates that dividend increases can be seen 
as a positive signal of the firm‟s future earnings and then also the value of the 
firm‟s shares. One of the key implications of these models is that dividend 
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changes should be followed by changes in firm profitability (earnings growth rates 
or return on assets) in the same direction. 
 
However, recent studies have not supported ICD hypothesized relation between 
dividend changes and future earnings, studies by Watts (1973), Gonedes (1978), 
Penman (1983), Healy and Palepu (1988), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner 
(1996), Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (BMT, 1997), and Grullon, Michaely and 
Swaminathan (2002) find little or no evidence that dividend changes predict 
abnormal increases in earnings. For example, Watts (1973) finds a positive 
relationship between the two variables---dividend changes and future earnings, 
but this is not statistically significant. Thus, he concludes that the ICD is not 
economically meaningful. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) analyze 
managers tend to increase dividends because of overoptimistic forecasts about 
future earnings, and therefore the ICD is unreliable. Benartzi, Michaely and 
Thaler (1997) use a matched-sample approach in which dividend changing firms 
are matched to non-dividend changing firms based on their attributes such as 
market capitalization, industry, and past earnings performance and find no 
evidence of positive abnormal earnings changes after dividend increases. Grullon, 
Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) find that firms that increase dividends 
experience significant decline in their systematic risk, profitability, capital 
expenditures and cash levels, and suggest that dividend increases may be an 
important element of a firm‟s long-term transition from growth to a more mature 
phase.  
 
Although many papers don‟t support „the ICD hypothesis‟, Nissim and Ziv (2001) 
provide strong evidence in support of the information content of dividends 
hypothesis through using different methodologies. They use a particular model of 
earnings expectations and document that dividend changes are positively related 
to earnings changes in each of the two years following the dividend change. 
Nissim and Ziv argue that researchers have been using the wrong model to control 
for the expected changes in earnings; which result in previous studies have failed 
to uncover the true relation between dividends and future earnings. Specifically, 
Nissim and Ziv also show that dividend changes are positively related to the level 
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of future profitability when profitability is measured in terms of future earnings 
and future abnormal earnings.  
 
The findings in NZ are important, especially because past researchers find either 
the opposite relation (Penman, 1983), no relation, or a very weak relation 
(Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler, 1997). Recognizing the potential non-linearity in 
the relation between dividends and earnings, many of the prior investigators have 
used methods other than regression analysis and find results opposite to the ones 
in NZ. These consistent findings across studies and methodologies make the NZ 
results surprising.  
 
There are also differences in ICD hypothesis across countries with different 
institutional structures. In Japan, dividends are less sticky and more responsive to 
changes in earnings than their US counterparts. This is because Japanese firms 
have less information asymmetry and fewer agency conflicts (Dewenter and 
Warther, 1998). In Germany, dividends have less of a signaling role than that in 
the USA and UK (Goergen et al., 2005). In developing countries, dividends are a 
less viable mechanism for signaling compared to US counterparts (Aivazian et al., 
2003). Firms with more diversified shareholdings and lower concentrations of 
insider shareholdings are more likely to use dividends to signal (Tse, 2005). 
 
3. Data 
We will collect the firms listed on the Norwegian Stock Exchange for the years 
from 1994 to 2009 using the following criteria:  
i. The firm had to be nonfinancial. 
ii. The firm paid the dividend in two consecutive years. 
iii. The firm did not announce other distributions between the announcements of 
the previous dividend and current dividend. 
We will also collect the financial statement data and stock market data. 
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4. Hypotheses and methodology 
There is an important tax reform in Norway which increased dividend taxation 
during 2004-2006. In order to avoid the influence from the change of dividend 
taxation, we will divide the whole period to two periods: 1994-2004 and 2005-
2009. We will run the regression for each period separately to see the relationship 
of dividend and firm performance in different period, and at the same time, we 
will compare the results of these two periods, to see the managers‟ reaction 
considering the tax and future profit of firm. 
 
1) Dividend changes cannot predict future earnings in the next three years in 
Norwegian market. 
The initial analysis is to examine the relationship between dividend changes and 
future earnings for the two periods. First, we will run the basic regression based 
the model employed by Nissim and Ziv (2001): 
                    tttt ROEDIVRBEE    1201011                             (1) 
tE is the earning in year t, 1B  donates the book value of equity at the end of the 
previous year, 1tROE  means the return on the book value of equity and 0DIVR  
means the rate of dividend change in the year of dividend change, which is equal 
to 
1-
1-0
0
DIV
DIV-DIV
DIVR  ,where 0DIV  is the dividend at year 0 and 1-DIV is the 
dividend in the previous year. Here we just run the results for t=1, t=2 and t=3, 
since Nissim and Ziv (2001) reported that dividend changes significantly positive 
relate to the future earnings in the subsequent two years. For the procedures to get 
the cross-section regression results, we adopt the Fama and Macbeth (1973) 
method: estimate cross-sectional regression coefficients and adjusted R
2
 for each 
year, and then calculated the time-series means of the estimate cross-sectional 
regression coefficients and adjusted R
2
.  
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There is a problem in the equation (1): the earning changes may have probability 
of autocorrelation (Benartzi et al. (1997)), so we add lagged variables of the 
dependent variables, and the equation (1) become following equation: 
     tttt BEROEDIVRBEE    11031201011 E               (2) 
 
2) Dividend omissions can signal the future earnings, but dividend initiations 
cannot signal the future earnings. 
Certain previous studied issued that the predictions to earnings of increased 
dividends and of decreased dividends are symmetric. (e.g., DeAngelo et al. (1990) 
and Benartzi et al.(1997)). Here, we are interested the results dividend initiations 
and dividend omissions, so we also do the separate examine for the dividend 
initiations group and dividend omissions group by employing the dummy variable. 
            
 
  tt
tt
BEEROE
DRDNCDIVRDPCE






110413
0201011 IV**BE
                   (3) 
When the dividend increases out of zero, the dummy variable DPC equal to 1 and 
DNC equal to 0; when the dividend payment is canceled, DPC is 0 and DNC is 1. 
 
In the hypothsis 1 and 2, the models used assume that earnings are a uniform 
mean reversion process and their autocorrection is linear. However, some scholars, 
such as Elgers and Lo (1994) and Fama and French (2000), pointed out that mean 
reversion process and level of autocorrelation of earning are nonlinear: the mean 
reversion is faster for large changes and negative changes rather than for small 
changes and positive changes. Therefore, Grullon et al. (2005) employ an 
alternative equation to capture the nonlinearity of earnings. See the following 
equation (4).  
 
 
  t
tt
CECEPCEDCENCEDNCED
DFEDFEPDFEDDFENDFEDNDFED
DIVRDNCDIVRDPCBE





 
0040321
0040321
0201011
***
***
**E
 
Where DFE  equals to  00 ROEE-ROE  and  0EROE  is the fitted value from 
the cross-section regression of ROE0 on the logarithm of the total asset in 
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previous year, the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of the equity in previous 
year and 1ROE . NDFED is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if DFE0 
is negative and 0 otherwise, and PNDFED is 1 if DFE0 is positive and 0 otherwise. 
For the latter part of equation, CE0 refers to   110  BEE  and NCED (OCED) is 
also a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if CE0 is negative (positive) and 
0 otherwise. When the dividend increases out of zero, the dummy variable DPC 
equal to 1 and DNC equal to 0; when the dividend payment is canceled, DPC is 0 
and DNC is 1. 
And we will use this non-linear equation to run the samples for dividend 
initiations sample and dividend omissions sample, to see the results in different 
two periods. 
 
3) The relationship between dividend changes and future earnings is positive 
significant for small Norwegian firms, but not positive significant for large 
Norwegian firms. 
Additionally, we are interested in the ICD hypothesis in the large and small firms.  
According to the CCGR database which is owned by Centre for Corporate 
Governance Research (CCGR), we divide the whole sample into two groups, 
small Norwegian firms and large Norwegian firms. 
We use the linear equation (2) and non-linear (4) to run the regressions, testing the 
ICD hypothesis separately for small Norwegian and large Norwegian firms.  
 
4) The ICD hypothesis is relatively not such significant when dividend 
taxation increases. 
We have divided the whole period into two periods above, considering the tax 
reform in Norway during 2004-2006. Therefore, in the above analysis and 
regression, we would obtain the different results for these two different periods. 
Here we will compare the different outcomes in regressions, and we expect the 
average coefficient in the second period (2005-2009) won't be such relatively 
significant compared with that in the first period (1994-2004). 
  
Dividend Changes and Firm Performance                                               01.09.2011                                                                                                                                      
 8 
 
5. Reference 
Aharony, Joseph and Itzhak Swary. 1980. "Quarterly dividend and earnings 
announcements and stockholders‟ returns: An empirical analysis." Journal of 
Finance, 35 (1): 1–12. 
Aivazian, V., Booth, L. and Cleary, S.. 2003. "Dividend policy and the 
organization of capital markets." Journal of Multinational financial management, 
13 (2): 101-121.  
Asquith, Paul and David W. Mullins, Jr.. 1983. "The impact of initiating dividend 
payments on shareholders‟ wealth." Journal of Business, 56 (1): 77–96. 
Bajaj, Mukesh and Anand M. Vijh. 1990. "Dividend clienteles and the 
information content of dividend changes." Journal of Financial Economics, 26 
(2): 193–219. 
Benartzi, S., R. Michaely and R. Thaler. 1997. "Do changes in dividends signal 
the future or the past?" Journal of Finance, 52 (3): 1007–1034. 
Bhattacharya, S. 1979. "Imperfect information, dividend policy, and “the bird in 
the hand” fallacy." Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1): 259–270. 
Brooks, Y., Charlton, W.T.Jr. and Hendershott, R.J.. 1998. "Do Firm use 
Dividends to Signal Large Future Cash Flow Increases." Financial Management, 
27 (3): 46-57.  
Dewenter, K.L. and Warther, V.A. 1998. "Dividend, Asymmetric Information, 
and Agency Conflicts: Evidence from a Comparison of the Dividend Policies of 
Japanese and U.S. Firms." The Journal of Finance, 53 (3): 879-904. 
Goergen, M., Renneboog, L. and Correia da Silva, L. 2005. "When do German      
firms change their dividends?" Journal of Corporate Finance, 11 (1-2): 375-399. 
Gonedes, Nicholas J. 1978. "Corporate signaling, external accounting, and capital 
market equilibrium: Evidence on dividends, income, and extraordinary items." 
Journal of Accounting Research, 16 (1): 26-79. 
Dividend Changes and Firm Performance                                               01.09.2011                                                                                                                                      
 9 
Grullon, Gustavo, Roni Michaely and Bhaskaram Swaminathan. 2002. "Are 
dividend changes a sign of firm maturity?" Journal of Business, 75 (3): 387-424. 
Grullon, G., R. Michaely, S. Benartzi and R. Thaler. 2005. "Dividend changes do 
not signal changes in future profitability." Journal of Business 78 (5): 1659–1682. 
Healy, P. M. and K. G. Palepu. 1988. "Earnings information conveyed by 
dividend initiations and omissions." Journal of Financial Economics, 21 (2): 
149–175. 
H. Kent Baker, Tarun K. Mukherjee and Ohannes George Paskelian. 2006. "How 
Norwegian managers view dividend policy." Global Finance Journal, 17 (1): 
155–176. 
John, Kose and Joseph Williams. 1985. "Dividends, dilution, and taxes: A 
signaling equilibrium." Journal of Finance, 40 (4): 1053-1070. 
Kale, J.R. and Noe, T.H. 1990. "Dividends, uncertainty and underwriting costs 
under asymmetric information." The Journal of Financial Research, 13 (4): 265-
277. 
Koch, P. D. and Shenoy, C. 1999. "The Information Content of Dividend and 
Capital Structure Policies." Financial Management, 28 (4): 16-35. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny. 2000. "Agency 
problems and dividend policies around the world." Journal of Finance, 55 (1): 
1–33. 
Lintner, J. 1956. "Distribution of income of corporations among dividends, 
retained earnings and taxes." American Economic Review, 60: 1–40. 
Miller, M. H. and F. Modigliani. 1961. "Dividend policy, growth, and the 
valuation of shares." Journal of Business, 34 (4): 411–433. 
Miller, M. H. and Rock, K. 1985. "Dividend policy under asymmetric 
information." Journal of Finance, 40 (4): 1031–1051. 
Dividend Changes and Firm Performance                                               01.09.2011                                                                                                                                      
 10 
Nissim, D. and A. Ziv. 2001. "Dividend changes and future profitability." Journal 
of Finance, 56 (6): 2111–2133. 
Penman, Stephen H.. 1983. "The predictive content of earnings forecasts and 
dividends." Journal of Finance, 38 (4): 1181-1199. 
Pettit, R. R.. 1972. "Dividend announcements, security performance, and capital 
market efficiency." Journal of Finance, 27 (5): 993–1007. 
Tse, C-B. 2005. "Use Dividends to Signal or Not: An examination of the UK 
Dividend Payout Patterns." Managerial Finance, 31 (4): 12-33. 
Watts, R.. 1973. "The information content of dividends." Journal of Business, 46 
(2): 191–211. 
Young M. Choi, HyoK. Ju and YoungK. Park. 2011. "Do dividend changes 
predict the future profitability of firms?" Accounting & Finance: 1-23. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-629X.2010.00379.x               
 
 
